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CONGRESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
Brian D. Feinstein*

In an era of increased concern over presidential power, congressional
oversight of the executive branch constitutes a substantial—but
underappreciated—means of influencing agency decision-making. Scholars too
often have overlooked it, and Congress is sub-optimally designed for its
provision, but oversight hearings have a sizeable impact on agency behavior.
This Article provides a corrective. It presents the legal mechanisms that
give oversight hearings their force and situates these hearings in their historical
and legal context. In light of this framework and historical practice, the Article
posits that ex post oversight hearings facilitate political control over the
administrative state. Because oversight gets its bite from an implicit threat of
legislative sanctions should an agency not change its behavior following
hearings, however, committees’ decisions whether to pursue oversight hinge on
the credibility of this threat.
To test this theory, the Article introduces an original dataset of over
14,000 agency “infractions,” i.e., agency actions that are potential subjects of
hearings. Analysis of these data reveals, first, that oversight is most likely to
occur when the particular preference alignment of Congress, the relevant
committee, and the agency make the threat of new legislation credible. A second
empirical analysis finds that, when oversight hearings do occur, they can get
results; infractions that are subject to hearings are 18.5% less likely to recur
compared to otherwise similar infractions that are not subject to hearings.
These findings call into question the received wisdom regarding
Congress’s role in governance. Whereas scholars focused on the political
branches’ formal powers see Congress as a branch in decline, a more nuanced
picture emerges when one also considers “soft powers,” like oversight. These
findings offer a blueprint for greater congressional involvement in
administration: to increase Congress’s role in governance, committee
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membership rosters should be representative of the larger legislature and
committees with overlapping jurisdictions should be established. By redesigning
its internal structure, Congress can promote more frequent oversight and,
because oversight can be consequential, thereby strengthens Congress as a
check on presidential administration.
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INTRODUCTION
In retrospect, it was only a blip on the media’s radar screen. But in the
summer of 2000, tire safety held the public’s attention.1 That summer, the nation
learned that failed Firestone tires were responsible for over one hundred deaths
during the previous several years.2 Concerned about the perceived inability of the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to identify and
adequately address the defect,3 Congress enacted legislation requiring the agency to
establish a data-reporting and analysis system by mid-2002 under which
manufacturers must submit to NHTSA information on accident-related claims.4
Yet NHTSA, with more industry-friendly officials at the helm following the
2000 election,5 dragged its feet.6 In 2002, a House subcommittee convened a
hearing, where several legislators sharply criticized NHTSA’s administrator for the
agency’s inaction concerning the defect information system.7
Following the hearing, NHTSA made swift progress, completing the first
phase of the system just nine months later.8 Two years after that, the agency issued
the first recall based on analysis using the new system—which, incredibly, had
become the government’s largest non-military computer database.9
1

See VANDERBILT TELEVISION NEWS ARCHIVE (Dec. 30, 2016), https://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu/search
(showing that the ABC, CBS, and NBC evening news programs aired 108 stories concerning
“Firestone” or “tire safety” between July 1, 2000 and September 30, 2000).
2

Keith Bradsher, More deaths are attributed to faulty Firestone tires, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2000, at
2.
3

See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 106-423, at 1 (2000) (statement of Sen. John McCain).

4

Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation (TREAD) Act of 2000,
Pub. L. No. 106-414, 3(b), 114 Stat. at 1801-02 (2000) (setting a June 30, 2002 deadline for creation
of the system for death, injury, and property claims).
5

See Myron Levin and Alan C. Miller, Industries get quiet protection from lawsuits, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
19, 2006, at A1.
See Office of Inspector General (“OIG”), Department of Transportation, Review of the Office of
Defects Investigation, Jan. 3, 2002 (Report No. MH-2002-071), at 5.
6

7

See Hearing, Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the Committee on
Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives, Implementation of the TREAD Act, Feb. 28,
2002, at 5-6 (Statement of Full Committee Ranking Member John Dingell (D-MI)); id. at 28
(Statement of Subcommittee Chair Cliff Stearns (R-FL)).
8

OIG, Department of Transportation, Follow-up Audit of the Office of Defects Investigation, Sept. 23,
2004 (Report No. MH-2004-088), at 5. The final phase of the system was completed in mid-2004. Id.
9

Kevin M. McDonald, Separations, Blow-outs, and Fallout: A TREADise on the Regulatory
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This sequence of events—Congress passes a law, the agency delays
implementation, Congress critiques the agency’s inaction, and the agency
improves—suggests that congressional pressure caused an otherwise recalcitrant
agency to act.10 Yet the episode stands outside of the accepted view of congressional
power. When scholars typically discuss Congress’s role, they tend to focus on the
branch’s well-known, direct powers: primarily its lawmaking function, along with
appropriations and appointments.11 Recent work on Congress’s other powers—most
notably Josh Chafetz’s study of Congress’s “soft powers” concerning the freedom of
speech or debate and each chamber’s powers to establish cameral rules and
discipline its members—has begun to challenge this conventional focus on the
institution’s legislative powers.12 Yet mechanisms, like oversight, that lie beyond
those delineated in the Constitution remain underappreciated—despite the significant
resources that Congress expends performing these functions.13 Given this incomplete
picture, it is not surprising that the received wisdom holds that Congress’s role in
policymaking, relative to that of the President, is diminished.14

Aftermath of the Ford-Firestone Tire Recall, 37 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 1073, 1177-78 (2004).
10

See Rep. Fred Upton, Press Release, Upton Announces Recall on Ford Excursion Firestone Tires
Issued
between
2000
and
2003,
Feb.
26,
2004,
available
on-line
at
http://webarchive.loc.gov/all/20050107134914/http://www.house.gov/upton/press/press-02-2704.html (last accessed Jan. 18, 2017) (credit-claiming by Rep. Upton, the principal sponsor of the Act
and major participant in the 2002 hearing, concerning the 2004 recall).
See Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, 160 U. PENN. L. REV. 715, 724 (2012) (noting that
Congress’s “hard powers,” or its formal means of coercion, e.g., legislation, the power of the purse,
impeachment, etc., “tend to be more familiar” than Congress’s “soft powers,” which presumably
include oversight); Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV 61, 65
(2006) (noting that “the dominant image” of Congress’s role in administration emphasizes its
lawmaking function, and that, once a law has been passed, “the only mechanisms that prevent the
administration from ignoring Congress’s goals altogether are judicial review and the possibility of
further legislation”).
11

JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION, LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE SEPARATION OF
POWERS 201-301 (2017).
12

13

See id. Data collected for this Article show that, each year in recent Congresses, House committees
and subcommittees convene a median of 221 critical hearings concerning agencies; for Senate
committees and subcommittees, the figure is 82 hearings annually. For both chambers, these figures
constitute marked increases from a generation ago.
14

See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen, From Sovereignty and Process to Administration and Politics: The
Afterlife of American Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1920, 1938 (2014), ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN
VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2010); BRUCE
ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2010); Sanford Levinson & Jack
Balkin, Constiutional Dictatorship: Its Dangers and Its Design, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1789 (2010);
Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive: Presidential Power from
Washington to Bush (2008); THOMAS MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: HOW
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This Article provides a corrective. It contends that, as NHTSA’s response to
congressional oversight hearings exemplifies, hearings provide Congress with a
powerful tool to influence administration. This Article tests this theory with an
original dataset of 14,431 agency “infractions,” which, as explained infra, comprise
the set of issues from which Congress tends to select its subjects for oversight
hearings. These infractions include critiques regarding a wide variety of regulatory
implementation, enforcement, and personnel issues across all executive departments
and major independent agencies, as raised in inspector-general reports, Government
Accountability Office “top challenges” lists, and newspaper editorials. For each
infraction, I identify, first, whether Congress held a hearing on the subject within one
year after its mention and, second, whether the infraction reappeared in the dataset in
the next year.
The use of this large-scale dataset allows for the comparison of agency
actions that are subject to oversight hearings with otherwise similar agency actions
for which Congress does not hold hearings. After all, one cannot know the
independent effect of the TREAD Act implementation hearing on NHTSA’s later
actions without comparing that episode to a (hypothetical) other NHTSA
implementation issue on which Congress did not hold hearings. This effort, the first
large-scale, quantitative study of congressional oversight, answers two questions:
under what conditions will oversight occur, and is this activity consequential? Taken
together, answers to these questions will shed light on the broader question of
whether oversight enables Congress to exert a degree of ex post control over the
administrative state following legislative enactments.
Empirical analysis concerning the first question shows that the particular
preference alignment of Congress, the relevant committee, and the relevant agency
affect whether oversight occurs concerning a given infraction. This finding is
attributable to Congress’s bifurcated structure: committees are empowered to
convene hearings, but only the full legislature may sanction agencies for continued
non-compliance following hearings. This structure encourages committees to ignore
some infractions that Congress might prefer to probe, based on the committees’ fears
that convening hearings could motivate Congress to enact legislative changes that the
committees oppose. Essentially, committees—mindful that their parent chamber’s
preferences may differ from their own—make strategic decisions concerning which
agencies they take to task and which they ignore.15

CONGRESS IS FAILING AMERICA AND HOW TO GET IT BACK ON TRACE (2006); William P. Marshall,
Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General, and Lessons from the Divided
Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2449 (2006).
15

See J. R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competition for Control of Delegated
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A second analysis finds that, when it occurs, oversight often is consequential,
changing agency behavior for a statistically significant 18.5% of infractions, relative
to otherwise similar infractions for which oversight does not occur. To put that figure
in perspective: agencies commit an average of 656 infractions per year, of which 239
infractions continue (or reoccur) the next year; by holding oversight hearings,
Congress prevents an additional 47 infractions per year from reappearing in the
dataset in the next year on average. Oversight alters agency behavior—moving it
towards congressional preferences on issues ranging from the level of regulatory
enforcement to the creation of programs that stretch agencies’ statutory authority, as
well as concerning more run-of-the-mill issues such as waste, fraud, and abuse—an
average of 89 times per year.
These findings have implications for our understanding of the roles that all
three branches play in the administrative state. First, the finding that committees
strategically decline to hold hearings based on the preference alignment of Congress,
the committee, and the relevant agency shows a subtle majoritarian dynamic at work
in Congress’s internal organization. Although committee-based oversight can be
remarkably impactful, outlier committees are less likely to engage in oversight.
Thus, the existence of a bifurcated congressional principal provides a majoritarian
check on unrepresentative committees—and cuts against arguments favoring strong
presidential administration based on the premise that congressional control
supposedly involves control by outlier committees.
Prescriptively, that finding suggests that those interested in enhancing
Congress’s capacity ought to do away with two of the branch’s institutional features:
legislators’ self-selection onto committees and the granting of exclusive jurisdictions
to committees. The current practice of allowing legislators to select their committee
assignments yields committees that are unrepresentative of floor preferences. As
explained infra, outlier committees refrain from convening oversight hearings in
instances where Congress would prefer hearings to occur. Thus, creating committees
that reflect congressional preferences would foster greater oversight. Similarly,
granting a single committee property rights to oversee a given agency reduces the
likelihood that the agency will be subject to oversight if that committee’s preferences
are not properly aligned with those of Congress and the agency. Accordingly,
placing agencies under the non-exclusive control of multiple committees would
encourage greater oversight.
Second, the finding that oversight can substantially alter agency behavior

Power, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1447 (2003); Steven Shimberg, Checks and Balance: Limitations on the
Power of Congressional Oversight, 54 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 241, 245 (1991).
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indicates that Congress’s position vis-à-vis the White House is not as diminished as
some suggest. In recent years, scholars have begun to push back against the
conventional perception of an enfeebled Congress.16 This Article contributes to this
nascent reassessment by adding oversight as among Congress’s soft powers that
provide the branch with a source of control over administrative agencies.17
Finally, these findings suggest that concerns that administrative law doctrines
leave the executive branch without supervision deserve reconsideration. In recent
years, a growing chorus of jurists and scholars has voiced concerns that deference
doctrines strip agencies of any checks, judicial or legislative, on their actions.18 That
oversight provides Congress with a powerful mechanism to influence agency
behavior—and that Congress has the ability to restructure its internal institutions to
promote even greater oversight, should it so desire—belies this notion. Thus, these
findings provide a rejoinder to critics of judicial deference to agencies on these
grounds.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides an overview of the
mechanics of congressional oversight, including the historical practices and legal
framework that shape how Congress conducts oversight. Part II examines the
circumstances in which agencies are subject to oversight or ignored, emphasizing
how congressional institutions—specifically, the committee system—impact the
branch’s oversight activities. Part III assesses whether oversight is consequential,
examining the extent to which hearings alter future agency behavior. Finally, Part IV
discusses implications of these findings and presents a blueprint for Congress to
better utilize its oversight function as a check on growing executive authority.
I. FUNDAMENTALS
A. Hearings and Alternatives
This Article examines one form of congressional monitoring of the
administrative state: oversight hearings convened by committees and subcommittees.
Congress’s oversight work, naturally, is not limited to on-the-record hearings.19
16

See, e.g., CHAFETZ, supra note 12, at 37; David Mayhew, Congress as a Handler of Challenges:
The Historical Record, 29 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 185, 211 (2015); Aziz Z. Huq, Binding the Executive
(by Law or by Politics), 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 777, 779-80 (2012).
17

Cf. Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61 STAN. L.
REV. 573 (2008) (on the persuasive influence of post-enactment congressional or cameral
resolutions).
18
19

See infra Section IV.E.
See Beermann, supra note 11, at 122.
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Actions ranging from informal, largely consequence-less discussions between
committee staffers and members of the senior executive service to, at the farthest
extreme, presidential impeachment and conviction trials all can be considered
oversight. Most oversight activity occurs at the lower end of this spectrum, with
legislators, staff members, and congressional support agencies, most prominently the
Government Accountability Office, communicating with agency personnel both to
receive information and to convey recommendations.20 Operating under time and
resource constraints, legislators outsource some of this information-gathering to
affected interest groups and provide mechanisms by which these groups can alert
allied legislators of disfavored agency action.21
More broadly, members of Congress also exert ex post influence over the
administrative state via the appropriations process, information-forcing reporting
requirements, the confirmation process, and casework.22 Committee-based legislative
vetoes—which persist as tacit understandings between committees and agencies in
the wake of the Supreme Court’s holding in Immigration and Naturalization Service
v. Chadha that the mechanism is unconstitutional—provide another means of ex post
control.23 In a sense, any congressional intervention in the executive branch could be
viewed as performance of Congress’s oversight function.24 Seen in this light, Carl
Friedrich’s observation that policymaking “is a continuous process, the formation of
which is inseparable from its execution” holds true.25
That virtually any legislative intervention that lies beyond Congress’s formal
powers can be classified as oversight stymies potential comparisons of the relative
efficacy of Congress’s many means of influencing the administrative state. For one,
legislators utilize these mechanisms—e.g., committee hearings, legislative support
agency audits, casework, informal staff contacts, etc.—for different purposes; one
20

JOEL ABERBACH, KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE: THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 132
(1990).
21

CHRISTOPHER FOREMAN, SIGNALS FROM THE HILL: CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT AND THE
CHALLENGE OF SOCIAL REGULATION 13 (1989).
22

See Neomi Rao, Administrative Collusion: How Delegation Diminishes the Collective Congress, 90
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1463, 1482 (2015).
23

See Louis Fisher, Legislative Vetoes After Chadha, CRS REP. FOR CONGRESS, May 2, 2005
(identifying hundreds of legislative vetoes in effect in 2005); I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
24

See FREDERICK KAISER, WALTER OLESZEK, AND TODD TATELMAN, CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
MANUAL 78-80 (2011) (classifying casework, audits, and the monitoring of the Federal Register as
forms of oversight).
25

Carl J. Friedrich, Public Policy and the Nature of Administrative Responsibility, in CARL J.
FRIEDRICH AND EDWARD MASON, EDS., PUBLIC POLICY 117 (1940).

8

Congress in the Administrative State

would not expect, for instance, a full-day hearing to investigate an undelivered
Social Security check. Further, with so many of these Congress-agency contacts
being informal and unrecorded (e.g., staff-level phone conversations), measurement
problems abound.
Thus, the scope of this Article is more limited; it focuses exclusively on
committee and subcommittee oversight hearings, which are the most direct,
observable form of congressional monitoring. Congress holds hundreds of hearings
annually, most of which occur in committees and subcommittees that have
jurisdictional mandates and dedicated staff resources to perform this function.26
These hearings are the most public, performative, high-stakes manner in which
Congress oversees the administrative state.27
Hearings—more than any other form of monitoring—enjoy a legal
framework that encourages their success. Most importantly, committees are
authorized to issue subpoenas to compel testimony at hearings.28 If an individual
fails to comply with a subpoena, either chamber may cite that individual for
contempt of Congress via one of three mechanisms: Congress’s inherent contempt
power,29 a criminal contempt statute available to both chambers,30 or a civil
contempt statute available to the Senate.31 In addition, witnesses that, whether under
oath or not, knowingly make a false statement concerning a material issue in the
presence of a quorum of committee members are subject to prosecution.32 Full
committees, by a two-thirds vote, also have the power to compel a witness’s
testimony following that individual’s assertion of his or her Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination.33 In these circumstances, the committee may
compel that witness’s testimony by obtaining a court order granting the witness
26

See Clerk of the House of Representatives, List of Standing Committees, Dec. 5, 2016, available online at http://clerk.house.gov/committee_info/scsoal.pdf (last accessed Jan. 2, 2017) (listing oversight
subcommittees nested in ten House authorization committees, as well as the Committee on Oversight
& Government Reform, which contains six subcommittees).
27

See Beermann, supra note 11, at 122.

See Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504 (1975) (reaffirming the constitutionality
of this subpoena power); RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Rule XI (authorizing all
standing committees and subcommittees to issue subpoenas); SENATE MANUAL, Rule XXVI (similar).
28

29

See Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204 (1821).

30

2 U.S.C. §§ 192 & 194.

31

2 U.S.C. §§ 288b, 288d and 28 U.S.C. § 1365.

32

18 U.S.C. § 1001(a), (c)(2).

33

KAISER, ET AL., supra note 24, at 32.
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immunity from future criminal prosecution.34
B. Historical Practice
As with many congressional functions, committee oversight hearings trace
their origins to the British Parliament.35 During the 1680s—roughly
contemporaneous with the expansion of parliamentary power in the Glorious
Revolution
of
1688—parliamentary
committees
investigated
alleged
misappropriations of funds by the navy, dissatisfaction with the conduct of the
Williamite War in Ireland, and the East India Company’s declaration of martial law
in a South Pacific island.36 Colonial legislatures in America adopted the practice,
investigating, inter alia, corruption in the granting of corporate charters, misconduct
by gubernatorial officials, and the disbursement of public funds.37
The U.S. Congress first addressed the question of whether it has the authority
to oversee executive affairs on March 27, 1792.38 On that date, the House voted
down a resolution directing the President to investigate the army’s defeat by
Shawnee and Miami forces in the Battle of the Wabash.39 In its place, the House
adopted an alternative resolution “empower[ing] [a House investigative committee]
to call for such persons, papers, and records, as may be necessary to assist their
inquiries.”40
From the early Republic until the 1910s, congressional oversight occurred on
an ad hoc basis, with most investigations conducted by short-term committees
established to examine discrete subjects.41 Investigations typically occurred every
few years during this period.42 The frequency and depth of investigations began to
increase in the early twentieth century. This development is attributable to the
confluence of two related trends: the rise of the Progressive movement and the
34

Id.

35

See generally James M. Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of
Investigation, 40 HARV. L. REV. 153, 162 (1926).
36

See id.

37

See id. at 165-66.

38

Id. at 170.

39

Id.

40

3 ANN. CONG. 490-94 (1792).

See DAVID R. MAYHEW, AMERICA’S CONGRESS: ACTIONS IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE, JAMES MADISON
THROUGH NEWT Gingrich 82-83 (2002); Landis, supra note 35, at 171-210.
41

42

See MAYHEW, supra; Landis, supra note 35.
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growing popularity of investigatory journalists known as muckrakers.43
Congressional attention to oversight continued to increase through World War II,
when Congress largely tabled its legislative function in favor of monitoring the war
effort, most prominently through the career-making Truman Committee.44
From the mid-twentieth century through the present, oversight hearings have
been a near-constant presence in Congress.45 The vast majority of hearings during
this period—and, hence, the vast majority of hearings analyzed in this Article—
probe relatively narrow subjects, e.g., the Bureau of Land Management’s fee
schedules for agricultural and extractive uses of public land, the National Weather
Service’s efforts to commercialize its intellectual property, etc. Occasionally,
however, Congress addresses high-profile subjects, conducting compelling, televised
hearings that become embedded in the public conscience.46 Often, a single proper
noun is all that is needed to evoke these complex, dramatic events: Kefauver,
McCarthy, Watergate, Iran-Contra, Benghazi.
Although high-profile hearings that occurred during the period under study in
this Article are included in my analysis, they are only part of the story. This project’s
aims are broader: to shine a light on Congress’s often overlooked, routine oversight
of administrative agencies, showing that the use of this basic function enables
Congress to influence executive-branch outcomes following the passage of laws.
C. Legal Authority
The legal framework for the current oversight regime is a product of Supreme
Court case law, largely from the early- to mid-twentieth century, that defines the
constitutionally permissible scope of congressional investigations, and a combination
of public law and congressional rules, enacted in bursts of reform-minded legislative
activity during the 1940s and 1970s, that establishes the institutional structures
through which Congress conducts oversight.
Constitutional Authority
Although the Constitution does not expressly grant Congress the power to
conduct oversight, the Supreme Court has held that the “power of the Congress to

43

See MAYHEW, supra note 41.

44

See id.

45

See DOUGLAS L. KRINER & ERIC SCHICKLER, INVESTIGATING THE PRESIDENT 38 (2016).

46

See MAYHEW, supra note 41, at 82-90.

11

Congress in the Administrative State

conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative process.”47 Thus, Congress’s
oversight powers are implied by the Constitution and are coterminous with the
branch’s lawmaking powers.48 This connection between oversight and lawmaking is
crucial; Congress’s oversight power must be applied “in aid of the legislative
function.”49
In determining whether a committee hearing meets this constitutional
requirement, the Supreme Court adopts a broad definition of “legislative function.”
For instance, in McGrain v. Daugherty, the Court held that a Senate investigation
into the Teapot Dome scandal was constitutionally valid,50 despite the vagueness of
the language in the Senate resolution authorizing the hearings: to obtain “information
necessary as a basis for such legislative and other action as the Senate may deem
necessary and proper.”51 Acknowledging that “[a]n express avowal of the object [of
the hearings] would have been better,” the Court nonetheless held that the Senate’s
stated purpose was constitutionally adequate. “The only legitimate object the Senate
could have in ordering the investigation was to aid it in legislating,” the Court
concluded, “and we think the subject matter was such that the presumption should be
indulged that this was the real object.”52
This broad definition of legislative purpose notwithstanding, the Supreme
Court does not give Congress carte blanche to conduct hearings. Since congressional
investigations resemble aspects of both the legislative and judicial processes, it is
unsurprising that the Court has held that variants of well-established limits on these
processes also apply to oversight hearings.53 For example, because Congress cannot
enact laws that infringe on the First Amendment, neither can it compel testimony at
hearings whose only conceivable legislative purpose would infringe on the First
Amendment. In Watkins v. United States, for instance, the Court reversed on First
47

Watkins v. U.S., 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).

48

See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 435 (1977); Eastland, 421 U.S. 491;
Barenblatt v. U.S., 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Watkins, 354 U.S. 178; McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135
(1927).
49

Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1880).

50

273 U.S. 135 (1927).

51

CONG. REC. 68th Cong. 1st Sess. 7215-17.

52

273 U.S. at 178.

See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 112 (1959) (“Congress … must exercise its
[investigative] powers subject to the limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action,
more particularly in the context of [the oversight activities in] this case the relevant limitations of the
Bill of Rights.”).
53
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Amendment grounds a conviction for contempt of Congress following a union
official’s refusal to testify before the House Committee on Un-American Activities
on alleged communist involvement in organized labor.54 The Watkins Court reasoned
that since “an investigation is part of lawmaking,” it is “subject to the command that
the Congress shall make no law abridging freedom of speech or press or
assembly.”55
The Supreme Court also has indicated in dicta that the Fourth Amendment’s
bar on unreasonable searches and seizures extends to congressional investigations. In
McPhaul v. United States—another case originating with an Un-American Activities
Committee investigation—the Court applied the same standard to assess the
reasonableness of the committee’s subpoenas as it applied to Fourth Amendment
challenges to subpoenas issued in judicial and administrative proceedings.56
Concerning the Fifth Amendment, the Court has stated in dicta that the
privilege against self-incrimination is available to witnesses in congressional
investigations,57 despite the amendment’s express reference to persons “in any
criminal case.”58 The Due Process Clause also applies to congressional
investigations, mandating that “the pertinency of the interrogation to the topic under
the congressional committee’s inquiry must be brought home to the witness at the
time the questions are put to him.”59
Beyond the aforementioned constitutional limitations, however, courts are
reluctant to apply procedural safeguards that are typically associated with judicial
proceedings to the congressional context. For instance, there is no congressional
analogue to the right of a defendant in a judicial proceeding to cross-examine
witnesses pursuant to the Due Process and Confrontation clauses. 60 Courts are even
more deferential to Congress concerning the application of common-law privileges
to oversight hearings.61 For example, committees exercise complete discretion over
54

354 U.S. 178 (1957).

55

Id. at 197.

56

364 U.S. 372, 382-83 (1960).

57

Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161 (1955).

58

U.S. CONST. amend. V.

59

Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456, 467-68 (1961); see also Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 123-24,
Watkins, 354 U.S. at 214-15.
60

See U.S. v. Fort, 443 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1970).

61

See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d. 21, 39 (D.D.C. 1998) aff'’d in part, rev’d in
part on other grounds sub nom. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (rejecting an assertion
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whether to grant testimonial privileges, such as the attorney-client privilege, to
witnesses.62 The judiciary’s unwillingness to extend other constitutional and
common-law protections present in the judicial process to congressional
investigations arguably is itself rooted in the Constitution; this general deference to
congressional committees to devise their own procedural safeguards finds support in
the Rules of Proceedings Clause.63
Statutory Authority
The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 provides the foundation for the
contemporary Congress’s oversight work.64 The Act mandates that all House and
Senate standing committees “exercise continuous watchfulness of the execution [of
laws] by the administrative agencies,” and provided committees with enhanced
tools—namely, professional committee staffs and strengthened congressional
support agencies—to help achieve this goal.65 The Legislative Reorganization Act of
1970 and the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 further increased committee staffs
and the scope and budgets of congressional support agencies. 66 Beginning in the late
1970s, Congress augmented its information-gathering abilities—or, depending on
one’s perspective, outsourced much of this tedious and resource-intensive function to
the executive branch itself—by establishing positions within the executive branch
charged with issuing reports to Congress and the general public;67 mandating that the
executive periodically provide Congress with certain pre-specified information;68
and protecting executive branch whistleblowers from reprisal.69

of work-product immunity by the White House Counsel’s Office, based on the Office’s failure to
show that potential future congressional investigations constitute adversarial proceedings of the type
for which the privilege ordinarily may apply);
62

See id.

63

U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings …”).

64

See Beermann, supra note 11, at 122; see also Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, ch. 753, 60
Stat. 812 (codified 2 U.S.C. § 31).
65

Legislative Reorganization Act, supra.

66

Congressional Budget Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 325-29; Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, 84
Stat. 1168-71, 1173-79, 1181-85.
67

See Inspector General Reform Act of 2008; Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, 107 Stat. 2838
(1990); Inspector General Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 1101 (1978).
68

See GPRA Modernization Act of 2010, 124 Stat. 3866-84 (2010); Paperwork Reduction Act of
1995, 109 Stat. 163 (1995); Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, 107 Stat. 285-96
(1993).
69

See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010, 123 Stat. 3034 (2010); Whistleblower Protection Act
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Cameral Rules
Oversight hearings take place exclusively in committees and
subcommittees.70 As a formal matter, only the chair of the relevant committees or
subcommittee typically may call a hearing.71 In many committees, however, wellestablished norms dictate that the chair will call a hearing at the behest of a
significant number—often, but not always, a majority—of the group’s majority party
membership.72 Once called, a hearing in a House committee or subcommittee may be
conducted if at least two committee or subcommittee members are in attendance; for
most Senate committees and subcommittees, hearings may be held with only one
member present.73 Minority party members enjoy no formal rights to hold hearings
or issue subpoenas.74 Still, minority party members may participate fully in the
questioning of witnesses and, in the House, also may call their own witnesses at the
request of a majority of the minority members.75
II. OCCURRENCE
Given Congress’s substantial and deep-rooted oversight authority, the natural
next question is: when does Congress use this power? Specifically, when will
Congress’s committees engage in oversight? This Part provides a theory, grounded
in the legislative branch’s internal structure, to explain why committees convene
oversight hearings regarding certain agency actions and ignore others. This theory
generates three hypotheses, all of which relate to the concept that the particular
preference alignment of the relevant political actors affects whether oversight occurs
concerning the given agency action. To test the theory, this Part introduces an
original dataset of over 14,000 agency “infractions,” or potential subjects for
hearings, and examines which of these infractions cause congressional overseers to
act and which do not.

of 1989, 5 U.S.C. § 1213 et seq. (2000 ed. & Supp. III).
70

See RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FOR THE 113TH CONGRESS, Rule X; SENATE
MANUAL, Rule XXV, 112th Cong. (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/SMAN112/pdf/SMAN-112.pdf.
71

KAISER, ET AL., supra note 24, at 69.

72

KAISER, ET AL., supra.

73

Id. at 30.

74

Id. at 69.

75

Id.
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A. Theory
Congress as a Bifurcated Principal
While committee hearings may have several purposes and be directed at
multiple audiences, I posit that two audiences within government—the agency
subject to hearings and the overall legislative branch—often are particularly
important. Regarding the former audience, committee-based oversight serves as a
warning to the targeted agency: shape up or face sanctions.76 Considering the
nontrivial time and resource costs associated with convening a hearing, doing so
provides a costly signal to the agency, conveying the committee’s resolve.77 If the
agency does not alter its behavior to be more consistent with committee preferences,
the committee could introduce legislation sanctioning the offending agency, and, if
that legislation passes, the agency could face sizeable negative consequences.78 Thus,
oversight hearings provide powerful inducements to the targeted agency, based on
the legislative branch’s potential response should the agency not modify its
behavior.79
Concerning the latter audience, committee hearings provide a signal to the
overall legislative branch—which may have previously overlooked the agency’s
issue area—that legislative sanctions may be necessary. Since committees possess
limited independent power to sanction wayward agencies, oversight hearings are
consequential largely based on the signal that they provide to the larger legislative
branch, placing previously overlooked issues and agencies on the congressional
agenda.80 This agenda-setting function is not merely a byproduct of holding
See DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 111 (1974) (“[Legislators] can
affect the way legislation is implemented by giving postenactment cues to the bureaucracy. Behind
the cues lies the threat of future legislation, but in a relation of anticipated responses the cues may be
sufficient.”).
76

77

See Charles M. Cameron & B. Peter Rosendorff, A Signaling Theory of Congressional Oversight, 5
GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 44, 44 (1993) (“Hearings signal the resoluteness of the committee—the
likelihood that the committee will expend the effort to overrule the agency.”).
78

Committees also possess means to sanction agencies unilaterally. For instance, a committee may
decline to report an agency-favored bill or, for Senate committees, a nomination to the floor. While
the parent chamber may override these decisions by discharging the bill or nomination, the chamber
incurs costs in doing so. These unilateral sanctions are beyond the scope of this Article and remain a
promising avenue for future research.
79

See Beermann, supra note 11, at 125; Mark Seidenfeld, The Psychology of Accountability and
Political Review of Agency Rules, 51 DUKE L.J. 1059, 1078 (2001).
80

See FOREMAN, supra note 21, at 35 (“[T]he most common impact of congressional scrutiny is to
raise a given issue, whether significant or trivial, as a priority.”).

16

Congress in the Administrative State

publicized hearings. Rather, committee-based oversight derives its potency from the
cue it provides to Congress.
Figure 1 illustrates the basic sequence of agency and committee actions
relevant to a decision to conduct oversight. First, the committee, when faced with an
agency infraction, must decide whether or not to hold a hearing. Second, if a hearing
is held, the agency must decide whether to comply with or flout the committee’s
wishes following the hearing. Finally, if the agency decides not to comply, the
committee must decide whether to alert Congress to the agency’s intransigence.
Figure 1:
Committee & Agency Actions during the Oversight Process
Committee

hold hearing

ignore infraction

Status Quo

Agency

comply with
comm. demands

ignore
comm.
demands

Comply

Committee

introduce
sanctioning
legislation

take no
action

Yield

Sanction
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To provide a bit more detail, when presented with evidence of bureaucratic
wrongdoing, the committee is faced with a simple decision at the first node: hold
hearings or ignore the infraction. When making this initial decision, the committee
considers potential outcomes further down the game tree. If the committee chooses
to ignore the infraction, the game ends, with the status quo preserved. If the
committee holds a hearing, then the targeted agency is the next player to move.
Following the hearing, the agency may either comply with the committee’s demands
or ignore them.
If the agency ignores the committee’s demands, then the committee is faced
with a second choice. The first option is to punish the agency. There are several
forms of sanctions, all of which involve Congress’s exercise of its “hard powers.”81
For instance, Congress can narrow the scope of the agency’s mission; provide a more
detailed mandate to constrain the agency’s discretion; or, in the Senate, delay or
refuse to report out a nominee to the agency. All of these sanctions typically
originate with a first step taken by the House or Senate authorization committee with
oversight jurisdiction over the agency. (For ease of reference, throughout this Article
I refer to all of these measures—even those involving budgetary measures and
appointments—as “legislative sanctions.”)
Alternatively, the committee, when faced with an intransigent agency, may
yield. If from the committee’s perspective the potential legislative sanctions imposed
by Congress would be worse than other options, the committee may choose not to
act. Put more plainly, the agency calls the committee’s bluff.
Notice that, when deciding whether to hold a hearing, the committee must
take into account the likely responses of both the agency and Congress. Accordingly,
preference divergence between Congress and particular committees leads
committees to behave strategically in deciding which agencies (among those
agencies within the committees’ jurisdictions) to oversee.82 When deciding whether
to hold an oversight hearing, a committee must weigh the potential gains from
curbing agency misbehavior against the possibility that a hearing, by highlighting a
neglected corner of the executive branch, will awaken Congress to enact policy
changes that the committee opposes.

81

For a typology of Congress’s hard and soft powers, see CHAFETZ, supra note 12, at 3.

82

Jurisdictional boundaries, though often not precisely fixed, constrain these strategic decisions. See
generally DAVID C. KING, TURF WARS: HOW CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES CLAIM JURISDICTION
(1997).

18

Congress in the Administrative State

Similarly, preference divergence between the committee and agency makes
oversight less likely, all else equal. To see why, note that committee-agency
preference divergence increases the likelihood that the agency will ignore the
committee’s demands, thus leaving the committee with the choice between
acquiescing or alerting the larger legislature—which could lead to committeedisfavored legislative action. Because the committee may prefer the status quo to
either of these outcomes, the committee is less likely to engage in oversight in the
first instance when the committee and agency hold divergent preferences.
Thus, the insight that committees conduct oversight hearings, which get their
bite from the threat of Congress-imposed sanctions for continued agency noncompliance, has implications concerning when oversight will occur. Specifically, the
need for committees, when deciding whether to hold hearings, to anticipate both the
agency’s and Congress’s likely response to potential hearings, limits the set of issues
on which committees decide to hold hearings.
To be clear, this Article does not claim that committees engage in oversight
exclusively to influence agencies. Legislators may convene hearings to raise their
profiles with voters, donors, their colleagues, or others. Whether hearings also alter
agency behavior sometimes may be secondary, or even orthogonal, to these
objectives. Neither do agencies view hearings solely as a means to signal potential
legislative changes should the agency not bend to the committee. For instance,
agency officials may fear public admonishment in future hearings, and therefore
accommodate a committee to avoid future embarassment, irrespective of any
potential for legislative sanctions. The Article does assume, however, that the
prospect of influencing agencies is often in the mix when committees hold hearings;
in other words, that legislators to some extent care about influencing policy and that
a substantial source of their ability to exert influence is grounded in their legislative
power.
Hypotheses
The above theory leads to three testable hypotheses. The following notion
motivates all three hypotheses: When deciding whether to hold hearings, committees
will look down the game tree to weigh the expected result of hearings given the
relevant actors’ likely behavior at each subsequent node against the expected result if
the committee declines to hold hearings. This logic—essentially, a rudimentary
model of coercive bargaining—generates the following three hypotheses.
First, the distance between the political preferences of an agency and those of
Congress may impact committee oversight activity. When an agency and Congress
are largely in agreement, the supposed “threat” of legislation is less formidable,
giving agencies less of an incentive to conform to committee objectives following
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oversight hearings. Aware of this heightened risk of non-compliance, committees
may have less of an incentive to hold hearings under these circumstances.
Conversely, agencies with preferences that are far from those of Congress may be
more likely to be overseen. This rationale leads to the following hypothesis.



Hypothesis 1: As agency and congressional preferences diverge,
committee-based oversight tends to increase.

Second, differences between the agency and committee may affect oversight
levels. Here, the presence of a bifurcated congressional principal leads to an
unintuitive prediction. Common sense suggests that a committee is more likely to
oversee an agency with preferences that are at odds with the agency’s views. But the
theory presented above points to a different result. Consider that, as agency and
committee preferences converge, the agency may find compliance with committee
demands to be less onerous. Thus, when faced with a decision to either comply with
committee demands following a hearing or face the possibility of legislative
sanctions, agencies may be more likely to comply when their views are closer to
those of the committee. Committees, aware of this tendency, may be encouraged to
pursue oversight more vigorously.
Given the counterintuitive nature of this prediction, I present two competing
hypotheses; Hypothesis 2a states the “common sense” logic that agencies with
divergent preferences from those of the relevant committees will receive more
oversight attention, while Hypothesis 2b presents the converse, which is grounded in
the theory presented supra.



Hypothesis 2a: As agency and committee preferences diverge,
committee-based oversight tends to increase.



Hypothesis 2b: As agency and committee preferences converge,
committee-based oversight tends to increase.

At first blush, Hypothesis 2b may seem surprising. Why would a committee
be more likely to call attention to infractions committed by friendly agencies? Recall
that as agency and committee preferences diverge, the prospect of complying with
the committee following a hearing becomes less appealing to the agency—and, thus,
the agency is more willing to risk legislative sanctions, ceteris paribus. Looking
down the decision tree, the committee recognizes that oversight hearings are less
likely to yield agency compliance where agency and committee preferences diverge.
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Accordingly, the committee is less interested in holding oversight hearings in the
first instance. The basic rationale—which is familiar in the international relations
literature on economic sanctions—is that coercion is more likely to be effective
when the coercing actor and its target already have relatively close preferences,
because the target can more easily meet the sender’s demand in this circumstance;
thus, coercion is more likely to occur in the first instance.83
Third, I hypothetize that preference convergence between committee and
Congress is associated with increased oversight. Consider that as a hypothetical
sanctioning bill moves from committee markup to floor vote, the signal that the
originating committee had intended to send may be distorted; this distortion is
especially likely where the committee and chamber are at loggerheads.84 The
possibility that the enacted version of a sanctioning bill may deviate significantly
from committee intentions suggests that oversight may not occur when committee
and Congress hold markedly different preferences.85 Under these circumstances, the
sanctions threat that is necessary for oversight to have an effect may not be
plausible.86
Essentially, if the committee and legislature have opposing views, the
committee cannot credibly commit to introduce sanctioning legislation should the
agency not comply following a hearing, since this legislation could be altered during
post-markup stages, leading to a final product that is far removed from committee
objectives. Alternatively, the committee could worry that a hearing would alert
Congress to take up legislation in a previously unperturbed policy area, inadvertently
providing a cue to Congress, which, again, could lead to a legislative product far
from committee preferences. Aware of these potential outcomes, the committee may
neglect its oversight function when it and Congress hold disparate preferences, i.e.,
when the committee weakly prefers the status quo to Congress’s position in the
relevant issue area. By contrast, committees with political preferences that are
aligned with those of Congress may have greater incentive to pursue oversight.
See Daniel Drezner, Conflict Expectations and the Paradox of Economic Coercion, 42 INT’L STUD.
Q. 709 (1998).
83

See Terry Moe, An Assessment of the Positive Theory of “Congressional Dominance”, 12 LEGIS.
STUD. Q. 475, 488 (1987) (stating that, at the final passage stage, bills “may bear very little
resemblance to what the subcommittee originally threatened to produce”).
84

85

See Kathleen Bawn, Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy: Statutory Constraints,
Oversight, and the Committee System, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 101, 102-08 (1997) (noting that this
divergence is not an uncommon occurrence, due to the greater relative influence of organized interests
in committee).
86

See Moe, An Assessment, supra note 84, at 488 (“[T]he long-run prospect of a substantially
moderated, compromise bill is likely to carry little inducement value as a control mechanism.”).
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Hypothesis 3: As committee and congressional preferences converge,
oversight tends to increase.

B. Research Design
Unit of Analysis: Agency Infractions Data
To examine when a committee will decide to take up an agency action as the
subject of an oversight hearing, it is not sufficient simply to examine the
characteristics of agency actions that receive oversight attention; instead, one must
determine the pool of agency actions that potentially could lead to hearings—some
of which capture Congress’s attention whereas others do not—and probe the relevant
differences between the two groups that led Congress to focus its attention on the
former set of agency actions but not the latter.
Accordingly, I construct an original dataset of agency infractions, defined as
any perceived agency action during the 1991-2012 period that potentially could
result in a hearing.87 I derive these data from inspectors general (IG) semiannual
reports, Government Accountibility Office (GAO) annual “top management
challenges” lists, and New York Times and Wall Street Journal editorials. For each
action, I employ a mix of hand-coding by a research assistant and automatic text
analysis techniques88 to identify both the relevant agency and the subject matter of
87

This period covers Congresses with a variety of partisan alignments and changes in presidential and
congressional leadership, thereby militating against the possibility of party-alignment- or
officeholder-driven results for the analysis to follow. Democrats and Republicans each held the
presidency and majorities in both chambers for approximately four years during this period.
(Republicans controlled all three entities for additional seven non-consecutive months in 2001-2002
due to several unusual events in a closely divided Senate.) Of the eight possible permutations of
Democratic or Republican control of the White House, Senate, and House, six occurred during this
period.
88

For the IG reports, I first ran a Perl script to extract text from PDF versions of each report. I then
ran a script to identify, within each report, text that is suggestive of an infraction. This script identified
text containing the agency name and, in close proximity, one of the subject areas listed in note 89, and
automatically assigned an agency code and a subject-matter code to each infraction. A research
assistant then reviewed these automated assignments. For the newspaper editorials, a research
assistant and I searched the New York Times and Wall Street Journal online archives for mentions of
each agency on each newspaper’s editorial page. One of us then read each editorial that mentioned an
agency to determine, first, whether the editorial criticized the agency and, if so, how to hand-code the
editorial concerning the agency code and subject-matter code. For the annual GAO Top Management
Challenges lists, I hand-coded each item on each list.

22

Congress in the Administrative State

the infraction, from a list of 42 subjects.89
These four sources capture a broad range of issues that plausibly could lead
to hearings. Inspector-general reports cover the widest range of subjects. GAO
management-challenges lists, which are separate from the reports that the agency
publishes at Congress’s direction, focus on information-technology, procurement,
and human resources. The newspaper editorials tend to discuss agencies that are
allegedly too harsh or too lenient with regulated groups or client groups, as well as
critiques of appointees’ alleged misconduct or incompetence. Figure 2 provides an
overview of the distribution of these 14,431 across the four sources.

89

These subject areas are: (1) financial management / qualified audit; (2) Government Performance &
Results Act implementation; (3) program evaluation; (4) information-resource management; (5)
information-technology issues, e.g., Clinger-Cohen Act implementation, the y2k bug, and IT
procurement; (6) Paperwork Reduction Act implementation; (7) Freedom of Information Act
implementation and related issues concerning secrecy; (8) intergovernmental relations; (9) facilities,
public-land, and construction management; (10) public land management; (11) procurement,
acquisitions, and non-construction contractor management; (12) rule or proposed rule with no
statutory basis; (13) grants to state or local governments; (14) grants to foreign governments; (15)
grants for domestic spending to individuals, universities, and NGOs; (16) foreign-aid grants or other
grants for foreign spending to individuals, universities, NGOs, foreign governments, and transnational
bodies; (17) other grant management issues; agency is (18) insufficiently or (19) overly attentive to
client group; (20) agency unable to prevent client group misbehavior; agency is (21) too harsh or (22)
too lenient to regulated group; (23) agency unable to prevent regulated group misbehavior; (24)
agency tolerates discrimination against its employees; agency tolerates discrimination against
contractors, clients, regulated groups, or others; (25) violence or threatened violence by agency
personnel; (26) safeguarding privacy or trade secrets; (27) other civil rights or civil liberties
violations; (28) recruiting qualified civil servants; (29) training civil servants; (30) incompetent civil
servants; (31) politically motivated civil servants; (32) bribery of civil servants; (33) fraud, theft of
government property, or improper billing by civil servants; (34) other misconduct by civil servants;
(35) incompetent or unqualified appointee; appointee unwilling to implement (36) congressional, (37)
presidential or secretarial, or (38) judicial directive; (39) attorney general unwilling to appoint special
prosecutor; (40) fraud, theft of government property, or improper billing by appointee; (41) conflict of
interest, or appearance thereof, caused by appointee’s ties; and (42) other misconduct by appointee.
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Figure 2: Sources of Agency Infractions Data

At first glance, compiling data on possible topics for oversight may appear to
be an exercise in futility. After all, on one level any criticism—no matter which
person or entity gives voice to it—about any aspect of the executive branch can be
considered a potential oversight topic. On the other side, using overly narrow criteria
for determining which critiques have a “reasonable” chance of being covered in
hearings may raise endogeneity concerns.
There are three reasons why this project avoids these pitfalls. First, the four
included sources capture the overwhelming majority—over 90%—of topics that
actually appear on Congress’s oversight agenda. The fact that the vast majority of
hearings can be traced to a specific infraction in the dataset provides compelling
support for the measure’s content validity. Second, legislator and staff surveys
suggest that overseers actually rely on these four sources when setting their oversight
agendas.90 Third, for those infractions identified in IG reports, which account for
11,970 of the 14,431 infractions in the dataset, endogeneity concerns—specifically,
the possibility of congressional influence in the subjects chosen—are not present,
since these offices are considered removed from congressional influence.91
I do not claim that legislators consult these particular four sources in
selecting potential topics. Rather, these four sources do a remarkably good job of
mirroring the content of the unknown sources—media, government offices,
90

See ABERBACH, supra note 20, at 89.

91

See PAUL LIGHT, MONITORING GOVERNMENT: INSPECTORS GENERAL AND THE SEARCH FOR
ACCOUNTABILITY 3-24 (1993).
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colleagues, supporters, etc.—that actually influence legislators’ oversight decisions.
Taken together, these four sources encompass the range of administrative issues that
tend to attract Congress’s attention.92
Neither do I suggest that legislators, in selecting topics for hearings, are
motivated primarily by an intention to actually “correct” agency behavior. Instead,
this Part expressly assumes that congressional oversight is politically motivated. But
recognition of the politicized nature of oversight does not imply that the subjects of
hearings are made up out of whole cloth. Rather, there almost always is some actual
“misbehavior” that grounds congressional oversight. While that real-world agency
action may be mere pretense, misrepresented or exaggerated for oversight-aspolitical theater, it is typically still present. Further, for those hearings topics that
arguably are manufactured, the New York Times and Wall Street Journal editorial
pages may capture many of these subjects. In fact, of the 5,202 unique oversight
hearings that House committees and subcommittees held between 1991 and 2012,
the subjects of 4,801 were cited in at least one of the four sources during the
preceding 12 months—a 7.7% omission rate. While I do not take a position
regarding the actual sources that politically motivated legislators use to select
subjects for hearings, this low incorrect classification rate indicates that, regardless
of the actual process by which oversight topics are generated, these four sources
generally are reflective of the actual pool of potential hearings.
Employing individual infractions as the unit of analysis represents an
improvement over past work on oversight, which relies on each hearing as the unit of
analysis.93 Including each infraction—regardless of whether it results in a hearing—
as an observation in this dataset allows for variation in the dependent value. Since
virtually all oversight hearings can be traced to a specific motivating agency action
92

The IG and GAO reports emphasize apolitical valence issues, e.g., procurement management,
employee retention, etc., while the two newpaper editorial pages often voice ideologically-driven
critiques. In addition, while all four sources address program implementation issues, GAO reports on
program implementation tend to cut across agencies, e.g., the executive branch is slow to implement
statutory provisions related to information technology. Also note that, unlike with most GAO reports,
which are compiled at legislators’ request, these “top management challenges” lists are compiled on
GAO’s own initiative. Moreover, although both the IG reports and the newspaper editorials frequently
feature corruption allegations, the Times and Journal tend to focus on behavior by senior appointees,
while the IGs deal with civil servants and, occasionally, lower-level appointees. Approximately 80%
of the infractions included in these data are derived from the IG reports, 9% from each of the
newspapers, and the remaining 2% from the GAO lists.
93

See, e.g., David C.W. Parker & Matthew M. Dull, Divided We Quarrel: The Politics of
Congressional Investigations, 1947-2004, 34 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 319 (2009); DAVID R. MAYHEW,
DIVIDED WE GOVERN: PARTY CONTROL, LAWMAKING, AND INVESTIGATIONS, 1946-1990 (1991);
ABERBACH, supra note 20; MORRIS S. OGUL, CONGRESS OVERSEES THE BUREAUCRACY (1976).
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or event, an analysis of oversight activity that does not consider the population of
possible oversight hearings is essentially omitting the most proximate and arguably
the most likely cause for a given topic to be placed on the oversight agenda.94
It is important to acknowledge that considerable variation among
infractions—each of which has unique characteristics—is stripped away in the
course of placing each infraction into one of the 42 subject-matter categories listed in
Footnote 89. To be sure, similar loss of detail occurs in many instances when
qualitative information is standardized as data;95 with the creation of a new dataset in
this Article, the reader sees how the sausage is made.
From the other direction, one also could say that the data are insufficiently
standardized. For instance, the charge that the Mine Safety & Health Administration
is insufficiently attentive to investigating fatal accidents (subject-matter category 22)
is obviously qualitatively different from an allegation of waste, fraud, or abuse in
National Parks Service construction projects (category 9). Most significantly, the
former charge has a political dimension, as the appropriate level of regulation is a
subject of political contestation, whereas the latter charge has lower political
salience. Further, the line between political and non-political “good government”
issues is often blurry. For instance, conservatives generally may care more about
Type I errors by agencies (e.g., a computer glitch that leads to the approval of
applicants that do not meet the standards for the Social Security disability program)
and liberals more about Type II errors (such as a glitch with the opposite effect).
To address this critique, I run the analyses to follow twice: once for all 42
categories of infractions and again for the subset of infractions with the clearest
connection to partisan contestation. This subset includes agency rulemakings
(category 12 in Footnote 89); grant decisions (13-17); solicitousness towards client
groups (18-20); solicitousness towards regulated groups (21-23); appointee
competence or responsiveness (35-39); and criminal or unethical behavior by an
appointee (40-42). The results of this second set of analyses are reported throughout
Parts II and III.

94

Moreover, a study seeking to determine what factors explain the occurrence of oversight hearings
that only examines those instances where oversight hearings occur is selecting on the dependent
variable, leading to potentially biased estimates.
95

See, e.g., ADAM J. BERINSKY, SILENT VOICES: PUBLIC OPINION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN
AMERICA (2006) (investigating the views of survey respondents who say they “don’t know” in
response to a survey question); Stephen R.G. Jones & W. Craig Riddell, The Measurement of
Unemployment: An Empirical Approach, 67 ECONOMETRICA 147 (1999) (discussing shortcomings in
the collection and interpretation of unemployment statistics).
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Dependent Variable: Oversight Hearings Data
For each infraction, I determine whether an oversight hearing was held in the
12 months following the first mention of the infraction. I define “oversight” broadly,
as inquiries into agency practices in which the agency undertakes autonomous action
or otherwise exercises discretion in a manner of which members of Congress may
disapprove. Common subjects of oversight hearings include agency-generated rules
and proposed rules; adjudicatory decisions; allegations of waste, fraud, or abuse;
non-statutorily mandated features of the executive branch’s structure; and many
procurement and personnel practices. To collect these data, I start with a dataset of
all hearings held during the relevant period from the Comparative Agendas Project
(CAP) database, a comprehensive online database of congressional activity, among
other topics.96 After excluding non-oversight-related hearings,97 a research assistant
or I read the short descriptions of each hearing in the CAP database and classify each
hearing by the target agency and subject matter, using the same agency and subjectmatter codes as for the infractions data.98 With this procedure, I determine that
Congress held 5,202 oversight hearings between 1991 and 2012.
Independent Variables: Congressional, Committee, and Agency Preferences
Converting the hypotheses in Part II.A into testable variables involves
identifying preference estimates for Congress, its committees and subcommittees,
and executive agencies.
To determine congressional and subcommittee preferences, I start with the
DW-NOMINATE dataset, which contains estimates on a unidimensional scale of
each legislator’s ideological position based on that legislator’s roll call voting
record.99 I measure congressional preferences using preference estimate for the
96

FRANK BAUMGARTNER & BRYAN JONES, Congressional Hearings, COMPARATIVE AGENDAS
PROJECT: U.S. POLICY AGENDAS, available at www.comparativeagendas.net./us.
97

I excluded all hearings that (i) CAP coded as an appropriations hearing, markup, or bill referral; (ii)
the hearings description, as included in the CAP dataset, included the phased “as required by”; (iii)
the hearing title or description indicated that the primary purpose of the hearing was to consider new
legislation; or (iv) the hearing title explicitly praised the subject agency.
98

Where the short description did not provide sufficient information, we accessed the Congressional
Information Service database to examine hearing testimony and other primary source information to
determine which agency was the principal subject of each hearing.
99

See Royce Carroll, Jeff Lewis, James Lo, Nolan McCarty, Keith Poole, & Howard Rosenthal,
“DW-NOMINATE
Scores
with
Bootstrapped
Standard
Errors,”
available
at
http://voteview.com/dwnominate.asp. See also KEITH POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A
POLITICAL-ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ROLL CALL VOTING (1997). All calculations utilize first dimension
Common Space DW-NOMINATE scores.
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median House majority party member.100
To measure subcommittee preferences, I then identify the subcommittee with
the most legitimate jurisdictional claim over each infraction.101 I use the preference
estimate for the subcommittee chair as a proxy for the subcommittee’s preferences,
which is proper because most subcommittees formally authorize only the chair to
call a hearing.102
To ascertain agency preferences, I employ Chen-Johnson scores.103 These
authors use bureaucrats’ campaign contributions to elected officials to estimate
agencies’ ideological views. They then imput the roll-call-based preference estimate
for the elected official back to the donor, using a weighted average to determine the
preferences of individuals that donate to multiple politicians.104
100

A set of alternative specifications uses the median House member as an alternative proxy for
chamber preferences. The results using this measure were substantially similar to those reported in the
main model.
101

The decision to hold hearings can properly be considered to rest with the subcommittee. For
Democratic-controlled Congresses during this period, the subcommittee bill of rights granted to
subcommittees powers that are relevant to a decision to hold hearings. See Richard Hall & Lawrence
Evans, The Power of Subcommittees, 52 J. POL. 335 (1990). During periods of Republican rule, when
the formal powers previously assigned to subcommittees were rolled back, subcommittees still
retained their authority in many oversight-related areas, through norms and other informal
mechanisms. See John Baughman, The Role of Subcommittees After the Republican Revolution, 34
AM. POL. RES. 243 (2006). Because the House and Senate rules do not delineate subcommittees’
jurisdictions, these determinations necessarily were, in essence, judgment calls. For each infraction, I
identify the relevant subcommittee for each infraction by examining subcommittee names and, where
possible, descriptions of the subcommittee turf on the subcommittee’s website.
102

KAISER, ET AL., supra note 24, at 69. As an alternative specification for subcommittee preferences,
I also used preference estimates for that group’s median majority party member. As discussed in Part
I.C, many subcommittees by convention permit a subset of subcommittee members—typically a
majority of the majority-party members—to call a hearing. Id. The minority party, by contrast,
essentially plays no role in the scheduling of oversight hearings. See MARTIN JAMES, CONGRESSIONAL
OVERSIGHT 48 (2002). In light of the role that a majority of the majority party plays, this median
provides a second way to operationalization subcommittee preferences. The results in Parts II and III
using this alternative specification are substantially similar.
103

Jowei Chen & Tim Johnson, Federal Unionization and Presidential Control of the Bureaucracy:
Estimating and Explaining Ideological Change in Executive Agencies, 27 J. THEORETICAL POL. 151
(2015), dataset available at http://www-personal.umich.edu/~jowei/AgencyIdeology/.
104

A set of alternative specifications uses agency-ideology scores derived from a survey of prominent
administrative scholars and journalists, polling each respondent on his or her opinion of various
agencies’ ideological outlooks. See Joshua Clinton & David E. Lewis, Expert Opinion, Agency
Characteristics, and Agency Preferences, 16 POL. ANALYSIS 3, 11 (2008). The results using this
measure of agency ideology were substantially similar to those reported in the main model.
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Finally, to construct Agency-Chamber Divergence, I normalize the ChenJohnson and DW-NOMINATE scores for, respectively, agencies and the House and
Senate, on a zero to one scale. I then calculate the absolute value of the distance
between these two scores for each agency-chamber dyad. I employ a similar
procedure to create Agency-Comm. Convergence and Comm.-Chamber
Convergence.105
C. Results
With a pool of 14,431 agency infractions as the unit of analysis, 5,202
oversight hearings as the dependent variable, and political preference estimates for
Congress, its committees, and all executive and most independent agencies as
independent variables, I run a series of logistic regression models to test the
hypotheses listed in Part II.A. To provide a substantive interpretation of the
coefficient estimates, I then simulate first differences.
Table 1 reports the results of these models. The first column shows the
theorized directions of the relevant coefficients, based on the hypotheses developed
above. Model 1 reports the results of a series of bivariate models using all infractions
as observations. Model 2 reports the results of a multivariate model using these same
data. Models 3 and 4 report these results only for infractions in the most politically
salient categories.106 For all models, the coefficient estimates show the association
between features of the congressional-committee-agency environment and the
likelihood of a committee convening at least one oversight hearing concerning that
infraction.

Because these quantities are easier to interpret if as becoming larger as the relevant actors’
preferences converge rather than diverge, Agency-Comm. Convergence and Comm.-Chamber
Convergence use the inverses of the absolute values of the distances between, respectively, agency
and committee and committee and chamber.
105

106

Recall from Part II.B that these most politically salient infractions are: agency rulemakings
(category 12 in Footnote 89); grant decisions (categories 13-17); solicitousness towards client groups
(18-20); solicitousness towards regulated groups (21-23); appointee competence or responsiveness
(35-39); and criminal or unethical behavior by an appointee (40-42).
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Table 1: Regression Results
All Infractions

High Salience Infractions

Theory
Predicts:

Model 1
(Bivariate
Models)

Model 2
(Multivar.
Model)

Model 3
(Bivar.
Models)

Model 4
(Multivar.
Model)

+
(H.1)

2.047**
(0.659)

1.831*
(0.834)

2.094**
(0.740)

1.443
(0.966)

Agency-Comm.
Convergence

- (H.2a)
+ (H.2b)

0.804
(0.885)

1.512*
(0.632)

0.304
(0.745)

1.704
(1.013)

Comm.-Chamber
Convergence

+
(H.3)

66.479***
(18.420)

53.835**
(20.005)

58.337*
(24.826)

64.936*
(29.402)

N

Y

N

Y

14,431

14,431

2,070

2,070

Agency-Chamber
Preference Divergence

Congress Fixed Effects
observations

Cells report coefficient estimates and, in parentheses, standard errors clustered by committee. Unit of analysis:
agency infractions. Dependent variable: whether at least one hearing was held concerning the infraction in the
12 months following the infraction’s mention. Models 1 and 3 include fixed effects for each Congress between
the 103rd and 112th (baseline category: 102nd Congress). *** signifies p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.
Models estimated via logistic regression.

The hypotheses related to Agency-Chamber Divergence and Comm.Chamber Convergence generally find support in Table 1. All of the associated
coefficient estimates are positively signed and, with the exception of AgencyChamber Divergence in Model 4, statistically significant. The story is more mixed
for Agency-Comm. Convergence. While the coefficient estimates are positive in all
four models, they only reach conventionally accepted levels of statistical significance
in Model 2, which is the full, multivariate model. In Models 1 and 3, the associated
standard errors dwarf the coefficient estimates.
The substantive interpretation of the these estimates is not intuitive. Figure 3
reports the expected change in the likelihood of a committee convening at least one
oversight hearing concerning an infraction when each covariate, in turn, shifts from
its 25th percentile value to its 75th percentile value. For instance, the value for the
Committee-Chamber Convergence variable indicates that oversight hearings are
10.6% more likely to occur in expectation when Committee-Chamber Convergence
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is at its 75th percentile value—i.e., when the preferences of the relevant committee
and its parent chamber are closer together than is the case for 75% of the
observations in the dataset—than when this variable is at its 25th percentile value.
These simulated first differences are generated from the Model 2, the full
model. Analyses grounded in the other models yield similar results for AgencyChamber Divergence and Comm.-Chamber Convergence and null results for
Agency-Comm. Convergence.
Figure 3: First Differences in the Expected Likelihood of Oversight

First Difference

0.20
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00
Agency-Chamber Agency-Comm. Comm.-Chamber
Divergence
Convergence
Convergence
n = 14,431. Figure reports simulated first differences in the expected likelihood of a committee
convening at least one oversight hearing concerning an infraction, when one shifts each explanatory
variable, in turn, from its 25th to its 75th percentile value. Bars signify 95% confidence interval.
Quantities of interest estimated by running 1000 simulations in Zelig using a logistic regression
model. See Christine Choirat, James Honaker, Kosuke Imai, Gary King, and Olivia Lau. Zelig:
Everyone's Statistical Software (2015 ed.), available on-line at www.zeligproject.org (last accessed
Jan 24, 2017). Unit of analysis: agency infractions. Dependent variable: whether at least one
hearing was held concerning the infraction in the 12 months following the infraction’s mention.

These results show that political differences among the various actors—
agencies, committees, and Congress—substantively affect which problems within
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administrative agencies become topics for oversight hearings.107 The reason why
committees must take other actors’ preferences into account when deciding whether
to conduct oversight is rooted in what this Article terms the oversight dilemma: the
impact of hearings requires the potential for sanctions following an agency’s noncompliance with committee objectives expressed in a hearing, but committees do not
possess any independent authority to impose these measures. Since oversight
involves a bifurcated principal, it is consequential only to the extent that an implied
threat of congressional sanctions following non-compliance with committee
objectives is credible. As a result, committees limit their oversight activity based on
factors in the larger political environment—but, when committee oversight does
occur, it is aligned with the more democratically representative preferences of the
overall Congress.
III. IMPACT
Determining whether oversight alters agency behavior or is merely
reelection-oriented posturing is essential to assessing whether oversight can serve as
an ex post check on delegated powers. Given Congress’s broad delegations of ex
ante policymaking authority to the executive branch;108 the relative weakness or
underuse of other ex post means of influence;109 and the judiciary’s broad
endorsement of the transfer of policymaking authority to the executive branch; 110 a
firm understanding of the consequences of ex post oversight is crucial to assessing
the extent to which Congress exercises control over the administrative state.
107

I also run similar simulated first differences for the 2,070 infractions in the most politically salient
categories. See supra Part II.B (listing these most politically salient infractions). The resulting
coefficient estimates are all properly signed and larger than the associated clustered standard errors,
although only Comm-Chamber Convergence achieves conventionally accepted levels of statistical
significance. These results may be attributable to the substantially smaller sample size in this model.
108

See Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraints on Agency
Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 434-39 (1999).
109

See Jack M. Beermann, The Turn Toward Congress in Administrative Law, 89 B.U. L. REV. 727,
731 (2009) [hereinafter Beermann, The Turn Toward Congress].
See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001) (noting that only a bare-bones
“intelligible principle,” such as that the regulation is in the “public interest,” is needed to satisfy the
nondelegation doctrine). The Court also grants agencies wide latitude in interpreting their organic
statutes and self-promulgated regulations, and in determining the appropriate administrative
procedures to govern their decision-making. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997); Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984); Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. 435 U.S. 19, 524 (1978). . Relatedly, courts exhibit an overall
disinclination to interfere where Congress has not unambiguously expressed its intent via ex ante
lawmaking. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842; Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678-79 (1981);
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
110
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The notion that oversight affords Congress some degree of control over
administration is in tension with the conventional wisdom. The dominant perspective
among legal scholars regarding the relative abilities of the political branches to
control the administrative state considers Congress in decline and the White House
ascendant.111 This perspective holds that, at least since the New Deal era, Congress
has demonstrated a willingness to cede policymaking power to the executive branch
via the enactment of broadly-written and, in some cases, deliberately vague statutes
that place few limits on administrative agencies.112 The judiciary mostly has assented
to this transfer of policymaking authority,113 with the Supreme Court upholding
every statute challenged on nondelegation grounds that it has considered since
1935.114 Further, the design of administrative procedures has proven inadequate as an
alternative means of congressional control. Although administrative procedures—in
theory—could be designed to faciliate popular or interest group influence in the
adminstrative state, thereby obviating the need for continued, direct congressional
involvement,115 Congress does devote much attention to this role.116
The received wisdom among legal scholars also focuses on the White
House’s development of a set of tools to enhance presidential control of
administration—a development that occurred concurrent to the decline in Congress’s
111

See supra note 14 (providing citations).

112

See Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules, supra note 108.

See Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. at 474 (requiring only that Congress provide an “intelligible
principle” to guide executive branch policymakers).
113

114

See Kathryn A. Watts, Rulemaking as Legislating, 103 GEO. L.J. 1003, 1012 (2015).

115

See Mathew McCubbins, Roger Noll, & Barry Weingast, Administrative Procedures as
Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987) [hereinafter McNollgast,
Procedures as Instruments]; accord Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79404, 6o Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 555-557, 706 (requiring a notice
and comment period before most agency rulemakings, mandating trial-like features in certain agency
adjudications, and requiring that substantial evidence support agency adjudicatory findings).
116

See Glen O. Robinson, Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies:
Political Uses of Structure and Process, 75 VA. L. REV. 483, 488 (1989) (noting that an overview of a
variety of agencies’ organic statutes “reveals no relevant specification of internal structure”); id. at
488-89 (arguing that this inter-agency procedural uniformity suggests that Congress does not vary
administrative procedures for the purpose of promoting agency responsiveness to favored groups,
which calls into question the notion that the APA enables a form of indirect congressional influence in
administration). Perhaps as a result, the formal ability of outside actors to challenge administrative
proceedings or outcomes is limited. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975) (the challenger bears
the burden of demonstrating actual bias in proceedings in which the same agency serves as
investigator and adjudicator); Envirocare of Utah v. NRC, 194 F.3d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Chevron
deference permits agencies to exclude certain parties from adjudications).
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exercise of its lawmaking authority.117 Most notably, the use of executive orders to
set administrative policy has become increasingly common since the New Deal
era.118 The establishment of the White House Office of Management & Budget in the
1970s,119 and the expanded role that its Office of Information & Regulatory Affairs
subunit has played since the 1980s and 1990s, rejecting proposed regulations that
failed its cost-benefit analyses, further bolstered presidential control of
administration.120 More recently, the increased use of presidential signing statements
as post-passage instruments of White House policy also augments presidential
power.121 Mostly unchallenged by the courts,122 these mechanisms reinforce the
perception that the President occupies the central position in the administrative
state.123 By contrast, many of the functional innovations proposed by Congress to
buttress its role in administration have been struck down on formalist, separation-ofpowers grounds.124
On the surface, trends in the use of these three formal control mechanisms—
i.e., Congress’s reduced role in lawmaking and concomitant delegation of
policymaking authority to administrative agencies; its inability to design
administrative procedures as an alternative means of indirect control; and the White
117

See Thomas O. Sargentich, The Contemporary Assault on Checks and Balances, 7 WIDENER J.
PUB. L. 231, 241-55 (1998).
118

See Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 132, 133 (1999).
Although OMB’s origins are in the 1920s Bureau of the Budget, the office’s reorganization in the
1970s significantly expanded its powers and strengthened its ties to the White House. See Elena
Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2275-76 (2001).
119

120

See id. at 2277-81, 2285-90.

121

See Abner Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV.
123 (1994).
122

But see Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (holding the presidential line item veto
unconstitutional).
123

See generally Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1728 (1996).

124

See Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252
(1991) (blocking legislators from serving on an administrative board); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S.
714 (1986) (striking down a statute that placed some budgetary authority in the hands of an executive
official removable only by Congress); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (disallowing the onechamber legislative veto). United States Senate v. FTC, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983) (holding the twochamber veto unconstitutional); Process Gas Group v. Consumer Energy Council, 463 U.S. 1216
(1983) (striking down a one-chamber veto of administrative rules); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976) (preventing congressional leaders from unilaterally selecting members of an independent
agency).
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House’s establishment of new mechanisms to enhance its involvement in
administration—suggest that Congress is a branch in decline.125 Yet emphasis on
these formal, directly coercive mechanisms neglects other potential means of
congressional influence.126 Consider that Congress began to pursue its oversight
function with renewed vigor during roughly the same period as its relative role in
policymaking declined. For instance, Congress passed its arguably two most
consequential oversight-related bills—the APA and the Legislative Reorganization
Act (LRA)—in 1946,127 directly following a period of massive presidential
aggrandizement during the New Deal and World War II.128 Equally noteworthy is the
fact that the 1970s and 1980s saw the concurrent development of new mechanisms
for presidential control of administration and increased congressional attention to
oversight.129 Perhaps Congress’s heightened attention to oversight constitutes an
attempt to reassert control over powers that had shifted to the executive branch.130
A. Theory
I claim that, in an era of greater executive involvement in administration,
Congress uses oversight hearings to retain some degree of control over delegated
powers. Political scientists have long debated whether Congress-agency relationships
are characterized by congressional abdication or congressional dominance. Grounded
in capture theory, the abdication perspective holds that because committees,
agencies, and interest groups tend to have close ties, the prospects for vigorous
committee oversight of agencies are slim.131 That reelection-focused legislators
125

See SEAN GAILMARD & JOHN W. PATTY, LEARNING WHILE GOVERNING: INFORMATION,
ACCOUNTABILITY, AND EXECUTIVE BRANCH INSTITUTIONS 168 (2012); Ackerman, supra note 14.
126

See Beermann, supra note 11, at 64-65; Chafetz, supra note 11, at 724.

The APA provided mechanisms by which interest groups could activate “fire alarms” to alert
Congress of disfavored administrative action. See Mathew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz,
Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165,
173 (1984). The LRA established the framework for Congress’s current oversight institutions. See
Beermann, supra note 11, at 122.
127

128

See ERIC SCHICKLER, DISJOINTED PLURALISM: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.S. CONGRESS (2001).
129

See Kagan, supra note 119, at 2277-81, 2285-90 (describing the strengthening of the White Housedirected OMB and OIRA during the 1980s); ABERBACH, supra note 20, at 34-37 (noting a marked
increase in oversight activity during the 1970s and 1980s).
130

Cf. Cynthia R. Farina, Undoing the New Deal Through the New Presidentialism, 22 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 227, 235 (1998) (stating that greater presidential involvement, “by raising the stakes for
other actors in the system, … may trigger an oversight arms race”).
131

See LAWRENCE DODD & RICHARD SCHOTT, CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1979);
THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES (1979);

35

Congress in the Administrative State

supposedly have little incentive to conduct the hard work of day-to-day oversight
(beyond headline-grabbing, high-profile probes) further supports the abdication
perspective.132 Thus, the provision of oversight constitutes a collective action
problem, with reelection-oriented legislators being poorly incentivized for its
production.
A second set of scholars, by contrast, considers Congress to dominate
agencies.133 According to congressional dominance theory, the fact that committees
are privileged actors in the legislative process empowers them to take on recalcitrant
agencies.134 Committee prerogatives during the budget and reauthorization processes
enable committees to control the agencies within their jurisdictions.135
Committees’ ability to oversee and direct agencies does not imply, however,
that committees actually engage in oversight, much less that this oversight is
consequential. Rather, congressional dominance theory contends that legislators
design bureaucratic institutions to respond to their preferences, through the
enactment of information-forcing provisions and via committees’ involvement in
appointments.136 In effect, according to dominance theory, committees substitute ex
ante means of control in place of ex post oversight. Rather than engaging in active,
continual monitoring of agencies (“police patrols,” in the theory’s parlance),
committees are mobilized to act only when an outside group, e.g., an interest group
aligned with the committee, sounds a “fire alarm” to notify the committee that
something is amiss.137

Seymour Scher, Conditions for Legislative Control, 25 J. POL. 526, 533-34 (1963).
132

See WILLIAM G. HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION: THE POLITICS OF DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL
ACTION (2003); Terry M. Moe, The Presidency and the Bureaucracy: The Presidential Advantage, in
MICHAEL NELSON, ED., THE PRESIDENCY AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 425 (2003).
133

See Mathew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and
Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431
(1989) [hereinafter McNollgast, Structure and Process]; McNollgast, Procedures as Instruments,
supra note 115; McCubbins and Schwartz, supra note 127.
134

See Barry R. Weingast and Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control?
Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765 (1983). See also
KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION 97 (1991) (regarding committee
perquisites in the lawmaking process).
135

See id.

136

See Randall L. Calvert, Mathew D. McCubbins & Barry R. Weingast, A Theory of Political
Control and Agency Discretion, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 588, 598, 604 (1989).
137

McCubbins and Schwartz, supra note 127, at 165-55.
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Abdication theory points to infrequent hearings as indicating that Congress is
shirking; dominance theory posits that infrequent hearings are a consequence of
well-crafted administrative procedures and interest-group monitoring that reduce the
need for congressional involvement.138 Missing from both theories is any evidence
regarding whether oversight hearings—when they occur—are consequential. If even
infrequent hearings significantly impact agency behavior, that hypothetical finding
would undercut the abdication perspective. Conversely, if hearings do not have an
impact, that finding would weaken the dominance perspective, which implies that,
when a fire alarm is pulled, that alarm should lead to changed agency behavior. Yet,
despite the role that oversight plays in both theories, little is known about how
consequential oversight activity actually is.139
The infractions data introduced in Part II can fill this gap. If specific
infractions are found to be less likely to recur following a hearing—relative to their
rate of recurrence when no hearing is held—this would suggest that executive branch
officials take oversight seriously. By contrast, a null finding would suggest that
oversight hearings are toothless—that, while hearings may serve members’ electoral
needs, they do not affect policy outcomes. This Part tests the hypothesis that
oversight hearings reduce recidivism; in other words, that infractions that are the
subject of oversight hearings are less likely to recur than are similar infractions that
do not appear on Congress’s oversight agenda.
Although I presume, based on Part II, that oversight derives much of its
138

See McNollgast, Structure and Process, supra note 133, at 443; McNollgast, Procedures as
Instruments, supra note 115, at 244.
139

Although there is no shortage of claims regarding the effects of oversight, these claims in large part
have not been tested globally, viz. beyond discrete case studies of particular agencies or issue areas.
Political science offers few empirically-grounded insights into the impact of oversight on
administrative outcomes, as scholars have not empirically analyzed the consequences of oversight in a
systemic manner. Instead, scholarship on oversight can be grouped into three categories. First,
scholars have debated the extent to which Congress and its members are motivated to conduct
oversight. See, e.g., ABERBACH, supra note 20. Second, positive political theorists have presented
theories of the conditions for or consequences of oversight. See, e.g., Murray Horn & Kenneth A.
Shepsle, Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 499
(1989); McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 127; Moe, supra note. Third, case studies examine the
consequences of oversight with respect to a limited number of specific agencies, congressional
committees, or policy areas. See, e.g., Mary Olson, Agency Rulemaking, Political Influence,
Regulation, and Industry Compliance, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 573 (1999) (studying the FDA); Jeffrey
C. Talbert, Bryan D. Jones, and Frank R. Baumgartner, Nonlegislative Hearings and Policy Change
in Congress, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 383 (1995) (drug abuse and three other issues); JOEL A. MINTZ,
ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA: HIGH STAKES AND HARD CHOICES (1995) (enivornmental policy); R.
DOUGLAS ARNOLD, CONGRESS AND THE BUREAUCRACY: A THEORY OF INFLUENCE (1979) (military
basing, public works projects and social services grants).
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power from an implicit threat of legislative sanctions should the agency not comply
with committee demands following a hearing, the analysis in this Part does not rely
on this assumption. Perhaps the embarrassment of being publicly criticized is enough
to motivate reputation-valuing agency officials to change. Or perhaps lower-level
agency officials angling for a promotion alert Congress to infractions (bypassing the
media), and when they are promoted, they implement changes; in this telling,
oversight motivates a personnel change, and this personnel change, in turn, leads to
new practices at the agency.
This Part is agnostic regarding the specific causal mechanism by which
hearings alter agency behavior. The basic notion to be tested here is less
complicated: that oversight matters. Congress marshals substantial resources to
perform its oversight function, from the time that legislators spend preparing for and
conducting hearings on often technical subjects to the engagement in these efforts of
hundreds of committee staff members—and thousands more at the Government
Accountability Office, Congressional Research Service, and other legislative support
agencies.140 Further, separate from committee staff, legislators’ personal staff
members often devote extensive time to oversight functions, including preparing
their political principals for hearings.141
Yet much of this activity, including most of the hundreds of hearings held
each year, does not make headlines. So why do legislators devote these resources to
oversight, incurring opportunity costs for the use of their time and salary space in
their staff budgets? Simply put, this Article posits that legislators expend resources
on oversight because oversight can get results.
B. Research Design
Foundations
Each agency action that is a plausible candidate for congressional attention
varies on two dimensions: congressional attention and recurrence. This variance
allows for evaluation of the consequences of oversight hearings, by comparing the
140

See WILLIAM WEST, CONTROLLING THE BUREAUCRACY 131-32 (1995); RICHARD HALL,
PARTICIPATION IN CONGRESS 138 (1996).
141

See ABERBACH, supra note 20, at 55. That legislators often utilize their personal staff for
committee oversight constitutes a revealed preference. Because members of Congress receive a single
lump sum for all personal staff compensation, every dollar spent on oversight work, including
preparing for hearings, that personal staff members conduct is one less dollar that can be used, e.g.,
for constituent service. See Ida A. Brudnick, Members’ Representational Allowance: History and
Usage, CRS REP. FOR CONGRESS, June 22, 2015, at 10.
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recurrence rate of infractions that lead to oversight hearings with the recurrence rate
for otherwise similar infractions that do not.
Once again, TREAD Act implementation is illustrative. Table 2 identifies
four problems with NHTSA’s implementation of the Act, all of which were derived
from the DOT Inspector General’s January 2002 report.142 The table classifies each
issue based on whether Congress held a hearing and whether the issue persisted.
Table 2: Typology of TREAD Act Implementation Issues
Hearing Held

No Hearing Held

Issue Resolved

(1)
Defect information system
not created by deadline

(3)
Peer review needed

Issue Persisted

(2)
Tire pressure warning rule
not created by deadline

(4)
Cost overruns

TREAD Act implementation provides examples of all four possible situations
included in Table 2. First, recall that the Department of Transportation’s Inspector
General faulted NHTSA for its inaction in creating a new defect information
system.143 The next month, a House oversight panel strongly criticized the agency
for this failure.144 NHTSA completed the first phase of the system later that year, and
the agency’s first recall based on the system occurred in 2004. 145 Accordingly, this
issue is placed in Box (1) in Table 2; Congress held a hearing, and the issue was
resolved.
Second, NHTSA’s failure to publish in a timely manner a rule requiring
automakers to install tire pressure warning systems also provoked legislators’ ire, but
did not change agency behavior. The TREAD Act required the agency to complete a
142

See OIG, Review of the Office of Defects Investigation, supra note 6.

143

Id.

144

Hearing, Implementation of the TREAD Act, supra note 7, at 5-6 (Statement of Full Committee
Ranking Member, and TREAD Act co-sponsor, John D. Dingell (D-MI)); id. at 28 (Statement of
Subcommittee Chair Cliff Stearns (R-FL)).
145

See OIG, Follow-up Audit of the Office of Defects Investigation, supra note 8, at 5; McDonald,
Separations, Blow-outs, and Fallout, 37 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. at 1177-78.
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rulemaking, by November 1, 2001, for a regulation requiring “a warning system in
new motor vehicles to indicate . . . when a tire is significantly under inflated.”146 The
Inspector General’s January 2002 report criticized the agency for failing to issue a
final rule.147 Legislators seized on this delay—and also faulted the agency for
indications from the notice-and-comment period that the agency was receptive to
undercutting the warning-system requirement—during the February 2002 hearing.148
On June 5, 2002, NHTSA published a final rule, which, after an additional
delay, would require select vehicles to include a pressure sensor on at least one
tire.149 The Second Circuit held that the rule’s allowance for automakers to forgo a
warning system on all but one tire was contrary to the TREAD Act’s unambiguous
text per Chevron and arbitrary and capricious per State Farm.150 With the rule
vacated, the Inspector General’s September 2004 report noted that rulemaking was
still ongoing—over 2 1/2 years after the hearing and almost three years after the
statutorily imposed deadline.151 Accordingly, this issue is placed in Box (2) in the
table; although oversight occurred concerning both perceived weaknesses in the
then-proposed rule and delays in its completion, this oversight was not effective.
Third, the Inspector General’s January 2002 report faulted NHTSA for
inconsistent decisions concerning whether recalls are warranted, and recommended
that the agency institute a form of peer review among its analysts. 152 Legislators did
not broach this subject in the February 2002 hearing or, indeed, in any other hearing.
The Inspector General, however, raised the subject sua sponte during the February
2002 session—to commend the agency for its responsiveness.153 Because this issue
146

Pub. L. No. 106–414, § 13, 114 Stat. at 1806.

147

See OIG, Review of the Office of Defects Investigation, supra note 6, at ii-v, 3, 30.

148

See Hearing, Implementation of the TREAD Act, supra note 7, at 2 (Statement of Subcmte. Chair
Cliff Stearns); id. at 6 (Statement of Rep. Ed Bryant); id. at 10 (Prepared Statement of Cmte. Chair
Billy Tauzin); id. at 32 (Statement of Rep. Fred Upton); id. at 34 (Statement of Rep. Bart Gordon).
149

49 C.F.R. § 571.138 pt. S4.2 (2002); 67 Fed. Reg. 38704, 38722-23 (June 5, 2002) (final rule).
Further, the rule be phased-in gradually over this three year period; it would not apply to a most new
vehicles until the second year. 67 Fed. Reg. at 38706, 38708-38709, 38722-38738; 66 Fed. Reg. at
38989-95. Finally, the rule did not specify any requirements after a three-year window. Id. at 38722.
Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Mineta, 340 F.3d 39, 62 (2d Cir. 2003). The court permitted the rule’s
incremental phase-in period to stand, however. See id.
150
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See OIG, Follow-up Audit of the Office of Defects Investigation, supra note 8, at 4, 9-10.
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See OIG, Review of the Office of Defects Investigation, supra note 6, at x, 13-16.

153

See Hearing, Implementation of the TREAD Act, supra note 7, at 6 (Statement of Inspector General
Kenneth M. Mead).
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was resolved without congressional intervention, it appears in Box (3).
Fourth, the Inspector General’s report criticized NHTSA for cost overruns
associated with implementing that Act.154 Not only did legislators ignore this critique
during oversight hearings, but one legislator faulted NHTSA for spending too little
money on implementation.155 Unsurprisingly, NHTSA’s failures to contain costs
reappeared in the Inspector General’s September 2004 report.156 This issue, which
Congress ignored and which persisted, belongs in Box (4).
A naïve analysis of the impact of oversight would compare the recurrence
rates of issues that receive congressional attention with those that do not. This
strategy, however, ignores the facts that neither the probability of selection for
oversight hearings nor the likelihood of “correction”—either post-oversight or, if no
hearings are held, at some future point—is uniform across subjects.
Consider that peer review is likely the most tractable issue included in Table
2. Requiring analysts to check each other’s work involves few tradeoffs; given that
NHTSA employed eight analysts in 2004,157 even doubling the staff to conduct peer
reviews would not be budget-busting. By contrast, Boxes (1) and (2) involve the
issuance of highly technical regulations for which NHTSA is required to consider
costs to automakers when crafting the rules,158 and Box (4)’s imperative to reduce
the agency’s outlays may place other program goals at risk.
Because issue areas differ in terms of both their suitability for oversight
hearings and their tractability, straightforward comparisons across these four
categories are impractical. Instead, one must compare the recurrence rate of issues
that are subject to oversight with otherwise similar issues that Congress ignores. The
remainder of this subpart describes how this comparison is made.
Connecting Infractions to Hearings and to Later Infractions
Part II.B, supra, introduced two new datasets: on agency infractions and
oversight hearings. In this Part, I use these datasets to examine the recurrence rate of
154

See OIG, Review of the Office of Defects Investigation, supra note 6, at viii-iv, 5-9.
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See Hearing, Implementation of the TREAD Act, supra note 7, at 6 (Statement of Rep. Dingell).
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See OIG, Follow-up Audit of the Office of Defects Investigation, supra note 8, at 2-7, 10-11, 14.
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See id. at 3.
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See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 553 (requiring notice and comment for substantive rulemakings); Exec. Order
12866 (mandating cost-benefit analysis for same); OIG, Follow-up Audit of the Office of Defects
Investigation, supra note 8, at 9 (describing the technical nature of the defect information system).
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infractions that are subject to hearings with the recurrence rate of otherwise similar
infractions that are not. First, I determine whether each infraction in the first dataset
is connected to a hearing in the second dataset. I code each infraction on two
dimensions: the targeted agency and the specific subject area, e.g., problems with
intergovernmental grants, under-enforcement concerns, etc.159 I then code each
hearing along the same two dimensions. Whenever an infraction and hearing are
assigned the same subject-area and agency code and the hearing occurred within the
12 months following the first mention on the infraction, I consider this particular
infraction to be the subject of that hearing. Finally, for each infraction (and
regardless of whether a hearing occurred), I determined whether an infraction with
the same agency and subject-matter codes reappeared in the infractions dataset in the
13 to 24 months following the initial infraction. Thus, this process identifies, for
each infraction, (i) whether the infraction led to a hearing and (ii) whether the
infraction reoccurred.
Method
To test the hypothesized causal relationship between oversight hearings and
agency recidivism, one cannot simply compare agency recidivism concerning
infractions that were and were not subject to hearings, because infractions in these
two groups likely differ in other ways that may be correlated with recidivism.
Neither is conventional regression analysis, with a set of variables controlling for
these other potential differences in infractions, appropriate.160 Accordingly, I use
genetic matching, a statistical method that allows for the evaluation of causal claims.
While it is impossible for a given infraction to simultaneously both receive and not
receive the “treatment” of an oversight hearing, matching provides a second-best
alternative for causal inference; it allows the analyst to identify a control observation
that is as similar as possible to a given treated observation concerning a set of
observable, pre-treatment covariates but for the fact that the control observation did
not receive the treatment.161
159

See supra note 89 (listing the 42 subject areas).

160

Because regression analysis involves the minimization of squared errors, marginal observations are
heavily weighted. This feature presents a problem where, as here, there are many observations in one
category that are extremely unlike observations in the other category, and thus cannot be “controlled
for” with a set of variables. For instance, because it would be absurd to think that a Watergate-style
event would not lead to at least one hearing, including such an event in a linear regression would lead
to biased estimates, regardless of the quality and quantity of the control variables or the weighting
scheme for outlying observations. Matching, by contrast, places emphasis on observations that have
similar covariates, so that extreme or marginal observations might receive no weight at all.
The causal effect of treatment τ on unit i is given by τi = Yi1—Yi0, where Yi1 is the potential
outcome if i receives treatment and Yi0 is the potential outcome if i does not. Assuming that the
process by which an observation i is selected into the treatment or control group is determined by Xi (a
161
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Genetic matching, specifying one-to-one matching with replacement, is the
most appropriate matching method for this analysis, based on the properties of some
of the covariates on which it is important to achieve balance. 162 The genetic
matching algorithm identifies a suitable set of ignored infractions to compare to the
set of infractions are are subject to at least one hearing, so that the distributions of the
two groups will be comparable in terms of a variety of specified confounding
factors.163
Covariates
set of observable, pre-treatment covariates), it is possible to estimate the average treatment effect for
the treated (ATT) as:



| (T = 1) = E[E(Yi | Xi, Ti = 1)—E(Yi | Xi, Ti = 0)]

where Ti is a treatment indicator, with a value of 1 if i is in the treatment regime and 0 otherwise. As
the above equation shows, calculating the ATT for observational data requires pairing treated
observations with untreated ones in terms of the covariates in X. Matching algorithms do just this:
pairing each treated unit with a closely-matched control unit. See Jasjeet Sekhon, Opiates for the
Matches: Matching Methods for Causal Inference, 12 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 487 (2009) (providing an
overview of matching methods).
162

Since most of the covariates are discrete, the Equal Percent Bias Reduction (EPBR) property does
not hold. Because multivariate matching based on Mahalanobis distance, propensity score matching
via logistic regression, and other affinely invariant matching methods all require that this property be
met, the fact that some covariates are discrete means that using these methods would result in greater
bias. Jasjeet Sekhon, Multivariate and Propensity Score Matching Software with Automated Balance
Optimization: The Matching Package for R, 42 J. STAT. SOFTWARE 1, 30 (2011). Genetic matching,
by contrast, does not require that EPBR hold. Genetic matching also compares favorably to propensity
score and Mahalanobis distance matching in terms of bias and mean squared error reduction; it also
does not require any parametric assumptions. See id. (providing an overview of the GenMatch
function); Sekhon, Opiates for the Matches, supra note (noting that this procedure minimizes the
largest covariate discrepancy between treatment and control groups, i.e., it maximizes covariate
balance).
163

See Alexis Diamond & Jasjeet Sekhon, Genetic Matching for Estimating Causal Effects: A
General Multivariate Matching Method for Achieving Balance in Observational Studies, Working
Paper, available at sekhon.berkeley.edu/papers/GenMatch.pdf. To provide a bit more technical detail
regarding the research design: Wi is a binary treatment indicator, coded as 1 if infraction i was dealt
with in an oversight hearing during the twelve months following its first mention, and zero otherwise.
X is a (n x k) matrix of k covariates and n infractions. Yi(0) denotes the number of times infraction i
would be mentioned in the four sources—IG reports, GAO lists, Times and Journal editorials—
subsequent to the initial 12 month period if the infraction is not taken up in an oversight hearing
during the 12 months following its initial mention. Yi(1) represents the number of times i would be
mentioned in these four sources if a hearing is held concerning i. Thus, Yi(0) and Yi(1) are “potential
outcomes,” representing the likelihood of issue i reappearing, with and without hearings. Assuming
unconfoundedness given the observed covariates—i.e., that, conditional on the observed covariates,
units are assigned to the treated group in a manner independent of outcomes—the average treatment
effect for the treated is: τATT = E(Yi(1)—Yi(0) | Wi = 1.
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This analysis matches on 11 factors that, taken together, capture the process
by which units are assigned to treatment.164 Specifically, the analysis includes three
covariates that capture the preference alignment among agency, committee, and
Congress (Agency-Committee Alignment, Committee-Chamber Alignment, and
Agency-Chamber Alignment); one covariate that captures background political
circumstances (Congress, i.e., the two-year period in the which the infraction
occurred); three covariates that relate to agency characteristics (Executive Order,
Regulatory Function, Defense / Foreign Affairs Function); three that measure the
salience of the infraction (NYT Mentions, WSJ Mentions, Total Mentions); and one
that captures the topic of the infraction (Subject Matter).
As discussed supra Part II, the relative preferences of Congress, the
committee, and the agency all impact the committee’s decision to hold oversight
hearings. These inter-actor relationships are captured in the Agency-Committee
Alignment, Committee-Chamber Alignment, and Agency-Congress Alignment
covariates.165
Congress, a dummy variable taking values corresponding to the 102nd
through 112th Congresses, is an especially important covariate, because it contains
information concerning a wide variety of relevant features of the political system,
e.g., the presence of divided government, the national mood, and the majority party
leadership’s macro-level oversight goals.
Executive Order captures whether the agency was created via an executive
order, department secretarial order, or executive branch-initiated reorganization plan
after 1946.166 According to William Howell & David Lewis, agencies that were
created via unilateral executive action are typically designed so as to maximize
The use of the terms of “treatment” and “control” is consistent with the nomenclature in matching
studies involving observational data in the social sciences. See, e.g., Gary King & Richard Nielsen,
Why Propensity Scores Should Not Be Used for Matching, Working Paper (Dec. 16, 2016), at *1,
available on-line at gking.harvard.edu/files/gking/files/psnot.pdf (last accessed Aug. 5, 2017). I do
not suggest that the two groups are identical, which is rarely possible in non-experimental settings.
164

As in Part II, subcommittee preferences are estimated using subcommittee chairs’ ideal point
estimates based on Common Space DW-NOMINATE scores, and agency preferences are captured by
Johnson-Chen scores.
165

166

These data were obtained from a dataset created by David Lewis for agencies created between
1946 and 1997. See David E. Lewis, Administrative Agency Insulation Data Set Code Book, available
at
IQSS
Dataverse
Network,
http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/faces/study/StudyPage.xhtml?globalId=hdl:1902.1/10129&studyListing
Index=0_d1de20ebf2b96353b798a93359b8. I supplemented this dataset by researching agencies
created between 1998 and 2012. Given that the creation of new agencies by unilateral executive action
is a relatively recent phenomenon, agencies created before 1946 were coded as a zero.
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presidential control.167 Given this Congress-subverting purpose, structural
differences between agencies with a statutory basis and those without may influence
the relative susceptibility of these two types of agencies to oversight.
Regulatory Function reflects whether a majority of the programs that the
agency administers are regulatory in nature.168 Whether an agency primarily
performs a regulatory function may affect its assignment to treatment, as the often
highly complex subject matter that regulatory agencies address may indicate that the
legislature’s hidden information problem is particularly acute. Thus, oversight could
be a more potent mechanism for information revelation for regulatory agencies.
Defense / Foreign Affairs Function refers to whether the agency’s primary
mission involves defense, foreign policy, international trade or foreign aid.169
Although the evidence is mixed, some scholars contend that Congress adopts a more
deferential posture towards the executive branch concerning foreign affairs. 170
NYT Mentions and WSJ Mentions are event counts of the number of times
these newspapers published a critical editorial concerning the agency infraction in
the 12 months following its first mention in any of the four sources. Taken together,
these covariates provide a crude measure of issue salience and media or public
attention, from sources considered to be left- and right-of-center, respectively. Total
Mentions in Year t is an event count of the number times that all four sources
criticize the agency regarding the infraction during the same 12 month period. This
covariate provides an additional measure of issue salience among inside-the-Beltway
actors.
167

William Howell and David E. Lewis, Agencies by Presidential Design, 64 J. POL. 1095, 1096
(2002).
See David E. Lewis, Testing Pendleton’s Premise: Do Political Appointees Make Worse
Bureaucrats?, 69 J. POL. 1073 (2007) (providing a description of OMB PART Management Grades,
which include program categories for every federal program in existence during these years, as well as
information specifying the agency in each program is located). I consider a agency to have a primarily
regulatory function if this dataset classifies at least half of the programs that the agency administers as
regulatory.
168

169

The contents of this variable were obtained from the David Lewis dataset for those agencies
establised between 1946 and 1997, and were entered based on the author’s own determinations for all
other agencies, see Lewis, Administrative Agency Insulation Data Set Code Book, supra note 166.
170

Compare LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER (1995); with WILLIAM G. HOWELL AND JON
PEVEHOUSE, WHILE DANGERS GATHER: CONGRESSIONAL CHECKS ON PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS
(2007); John Yoo, Politics as Law? The Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty, the Separation of Powers, and
Treaty Interpretation, 89 CAL. L. REV. 851, 875 (2001). Bureaucracy experts also generally consider
defense-focused agencies to have a more conservative outlook. Clinton & Lewis, supra note 104, at
11.
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Since one reasonably could expect infractions that are the subject of intense
media attention to be more likely subjects of oversight hearings, including these
three media-related covariates helps ensure that observations in the treated and
control groups are balanced in terms of public attention. That media attention to an
issue typically declines after an initial burst of coverage should not affect these
results, assuming that the rate of decline for issues that are the subject of oversight is
equivalent to the rate of decline for issues that are not subject to oversight.
Finally, Subject Matter is a categorical variable. Each infraction is assigned
one of 42 subject-matter codes, as listed in Footnote 89.
I set the matching function to match exactly on the Congress and Subject
Matter covariates and use the nearest match for all other covariates. 171 Through this
procedure, each infraction on which a committee held a hearing was matched with an
infraction for which oversight did not occur. For each matched pair, both the treated
and control infraction involved the same subject area and occurred during the same
Congress. Further, the two groups of observations are closely matched in terms of (i)
the alignment of political preferences among the agency, committee, and Congress;
(ii) whether the agency was created via executive order; whether the agency
performs (iii) a mostly regulatory or (iv) defense or foreign-relations functions; and
the number of instances that year in which (v) the New York Times editorial page;
(vii) the Wall Street Journal editorial page; or (vii) either newspaper’s editorial page
mentioned the infraction.172

171

Finding an exact match for each treatment unit on Congress is particularly desirable for two
reasons. First, as previously detailed, Congress is an particularly meaningful covariate, because it
captures a wide variety of features in the political environment. Second, the temporal, discrete nature
of this variable means that, in some circumstances, “close enough” is not adequate. Whereas, for
instance, the analyst might be satisfied with a match where the control and treated units have slightly
different values for, say, Agency-Congress Alignment, the same cannot necessarily be said for a pair
where, e.g., one unit is in the Democrat-led 103rd Congress and the other is in the Republican-led
104th Congress.
172

To test for post-matching balance between the treated and control groups, I ran paired sample ttests, for differences in means, and bootstrap Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, for differences in
distributions, concerning each covariate. Across these tests, the lowest p-value reported is 0.129,
which suggests that, using a strict p > 0.10 criterion, the matched groups can be considered balanced
on the covariates.
The matching function also substantially reduces standardized bias, or the mean difference
between the two groups divided by the standard deviation in the treated group, for all covariates. Prior
to matching, the standardized differences for three out of the 11 covariates exceed 20% precent. See
Paul Rosenbaum & Donald Rubin, Constructing a Control Group Using Multivariate Matched
Sampling Methods that Incorporate the Propensity Score, 39 AM. STATISTICIAN 33, 36 (1985)
(classifying standardized differences greater than 20% as large). Post-matching, the largest
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Having created the matched groups and asssessed balance,173 I then fit a
series of logistic regression models on the matched data. These models include all of
the previously mentioned covariates along with a dichotomous indicator variable
taking the value of 1 if a hearing was held within 12 months of the infraction’s first
mention. The outcome variable is whether the infraction is mentioned against in the
13-24 months following its first mention; standard errors are clustered by committee.
Before proceeding to the analysis, several qualifications are in order. Most
importantly, while the 11 included covariates capture significant considerations, they
do not exhaust the potential ways in which infractions subject to oversight could
differ from those that are ignored. For instance, infractions vary in importance to key
donors or interest groups, not to mention as pet causes among legislators; yet
operationalizing variation of these types is beyond this Article’s scope—and perhaps
beyond the realm of possibility. Further, several of the included covariates are rough
simulacra for the underlying concepts they seek to capture. For example, the number
of references to the infraction in two major newspaper editorial pages is a crude
proxy for salience, particularly as the media landscrape fractured during the study
period. While acknowledging these shortcomings—which in some form are present
in many observational studies—this Article nonetheless provides a first-cut
assessment of a key potential mechanism for congressional influence in the
administrative state.
C. Results
With each infraction for which a hearing was convened well-matched with an
otherwise similar infraction for which oversight did not occur, direct measurement of
the impact of congressional oversight on agency recidivism is possible. The top row
in Figure 4, labeled “Model 1 (1991-2012),” reports the estimated effect of holding
at least one hearing on whether there is at least one critical mention of the infraction
in any of the four sources during the following 12 months, along with the associated
95% confidence interval. The second row, labeled “Model 2 (1991-2012),” reports
this estimate only for the most politically salient infractions, i.e., those involving
agency rulemakings, grant decisions, the agency’s posture toward client groups and
regulated groups, and appointee competence and ethics.174 Subsequent rows show
standardized difference, for Defense / Foreign Affairs Function, is 1.0%. The fact that such close
balance was achieved on these covariates presents a strong case for unconfoundedness. Even though
treatment was not randomly assigned, one may say that it was not assigned on the basis of these
covariates, which capture a diverse set of factors related to the political climate, committee and
agency political preferences, media attention and overall issue salience.
173

See note 172.

174

Recall from Part II.B that these subject areas correspond to categories 12-23 and 35-42 in Footnote
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the estimated effects from running separate models (all of which include the full set
of infractions) for each combination of President and House party majority during
the 1991-2012 period.175

Figure 4: Effects of Hearings on Future Infractions,
by President & House of Representative Majority Party

MODEL 1 (1991-2012)

President & House Majority

MODEL 2 (1991-2012)
G.H.W. Bush - Dem.
Clinton - Dem.
Clinton - GOP
G.W. Bush - GOP
G.W. Bush - Dem.
Obama - Dem.
Obama - GOP
-0.4

-0.2

0.0

difference in the likelihood of the infraction being mentioned
at least once in the 12-24 mos. after its first appearance

Unit of analysis: agency infraction. Treatment: whether at least one hearing was held
concerning the infraction in the 12 months following the infraction’s mention. Outcome
variable: whether the infraction is mentioned at least once in the 12 months following treatment.
Study period: 102nd-112th Congresses (1991-2012). Bars signify 95% confidence intervals,
which were derived using committee-clustered standard errors.
Full model contains 14,431 observations and 5,202 treated observations (all of which were
matched), and 4,992 unweighted matched observations, i.e., control-group observations. (Two
hundred and ten control-group observations were matched with more than one treated
observation; an additional 4,237 control observations were not matched with any treated
observation, and thus were excluded.) Models estimated via logistic regression.

As Figure 4 shows, when a hearing is held concerning an infraction, that
89).
175

These models were run without the Congress covariate.
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infraction is less likely to reappear in the four sources than are similar infractions
that do not receive oversight attention. Overall, oversight attention is associated with
an 18.5% reduction in the likelihood of recurrence across all infractions (Model 1).
For the most politically salient infractions (Model 2), the estimated reduction is
14.6%—although the associated 95% confidence interval crosses zero, indicating
that we cannot reject the null result at this level.
Remarkably, these results persist during periods of both unified and divided
government. Figure 4 also shows that hearings are associated with a 7.3% to 22.9%
reduction in agency recidivism for all partisan combinations during this period
(although two of these estimates are not statistically significant). Contrary to
expectations based on the view that inter-branch competition will be most intense
when different parties control the branches,176 there does not appear to be a
discernable difference between the recidivism rates in periods of unified versus
divided government.
To put the magnitude of these effects in perspective, infractions that are not
subject to hearings have a 40.9% likelihood of recurrence in the next year;
infractions that are subject to hearings have a 33.3% likelihood of recurrence. To
better understand how this average 18.5% reduction in agency recidivism affects the
absolute number of agency infractions, Figure 5 provides the predicted probabilities
of infractions that were subject to hearings reappearing in the infractions dataset in
the 13-24 months after their appearance, compared to the predicted probabilities for
infractions that Congress ignored. As the estimates in the bottom-left corner of
Figure 5 show, infractions that appear once in a given year and are not subject to
hearings have a 33% predicted probability of recurrence, whereas infractions that
appear once in a given year but are subject to hearings have a 25% probability of
recurrence—a 24.2% reduction for infractions that appear only once in a given year.
As Figure 5 illustrates, infractions that appear more than once in a given year
are more likely to reappear in subsequent years, perhaps because infractions that
receive greater attention from the four sources are more difficult to resolve. Still, for
infractions that are mentioned between two and seven times in one year, the
probability that the infraction is mentioned the next year is lower when oversight
occurs. In most cases, this lower likelihood of recurrence is statistically significant,
as the lack of overlap in most of the 95% confidence intervals in Figure 5 conveys.

176

See Daryl Levinson and Richard Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV.
2311 (2006).
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Figure 5: Predicated Probability of Infraction Reappearing
in Dataset in Year Following First Mention

Figure reports simulated predicted probability of an infraction reappearing in the dataset in
the 13-24 months following its appearance. X-axis denotes the number of times that the
infraction appears in the dataset following its first appearance. Bars signify 95%
confidence intervals. Quantities of interest estimated by running 1000 simulations in Zelig
using a logistic regression model and holding Subcommittee Preferences and Agency
Preferences covariates at their means; Executive Order, Regulatory Function, and Def. /
For. Affairs Function at their modes; and NYT Mentions and WSJ Mentions at their
medians. See King, et al., Zelig, supra Figure 3. Unit of analysis: agency infractions.
(Infractions from all 42 categories in Footnote 89 are included.) Bars signify 95%
confidence intervals, which were derived using committee-clustered standard errors.

Assessing whether an 18.5% reduction indicates that oversight hearings are
consequential raises the question: compared to what? As discussed in Part I.A,
supra, Congress possesses various carrots and sticks for influencing agency
behavior. The importance of these other tools, ranging from informal legislatoradministrator contacts to GAO reports detailing agency misbehavior, should not be
discounted. On the other hand, these tools may derive their impact, at least in part,
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from the fact that they are deployed in the shadow of potential oversight hearings.
Regardless, this Part simply reports the marginal effect of oversight hearings,
whether those hearings occur in isolation or in combination with other means of
influence.
Naturally, the lack of quantifiable “success rates” for these other tools
hinders the assessment of the relative impact of oversight hearings compared to these
other measures. In absolute terms, the magnitude of an 18.5% reduction is in the eye
of the beholder. At least to this observer, though, the notion that a small subset of
legislators may be able to exert influence on the administrative state—which is
alternatively considered a co-equal fourth branch of government or the object of
growing presidential control— without passing a statute is noteworthy.
Conducting similar analyses for limited subsets of these infractions data
yields similar results as reported in the full model—albeit often just on the wrong
side of the conventionally accepted p < 0.05 level of statistical significance. As
discussed above, Model 2 in Figure 4 reports that oversight hearings are associated
with an estimated 14.6% reduction in the recurrence rate for a politically salient
subset of infractions (with a standard error of 0.084 associated with this 0.146 point
estimate).
Running separate models for infractions in each of the 42 subject areas yields
negative estimates for almost all models. Almost all these estimates are far from
conventionally accepted levels of statistical significance, however, perhaps because
of the relatively low number of observations in most categories. Accordingly, I
reclassify the 42 subject areas into seven “super-categories,” each of which contains
sufficient observations for analysis, and run a separate model for each of the seven
super-categories. Figure 6 reports the effect estimates and corresponding 95%
confidence intervals for each. Although, as Figure 6 shows, most of these intervals
just barely include positive numbers, and thus are not statistically significant at the p
< 0.05 level, all of the estimates except for “Civil Rights / Liberties Issues” are
significant at the p < 0.10 level.

51

Congress in the Administrative State

Figure 6: Effects of Hearings on Future Infractions, By Infraction Topic

Unit of analysis: agency infraction. Unit of analysis: agency infractions. (Infractions from all 42
categories in Footnote 89 are included.) Treatment: whether at least one hearing was held
concerning the infraction in the 12 months following the infraction’s mention. Outcome variable:
whether the infraction is mentioned at least once in the 12 months following treatment. Study
period: 102nd-112th Congresses (1991-2012). Models estimated via logistic regression. Bars signify
95% confidence intervals, which were derived using committee-clustered standard errors.

The fact that oversight reduces bureaucratic recividism is noteworthy and, for
those that believe that Congress ought to play an expanded role in administration,
encouraging. Coupling with the findings in Part II concerning when oversight will
occur, this result suggests several implications concerning the role of Congress in
administration.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
The basic conclusion from the preceding analyses is that, when undertaken,
oversight can have a significant effect on agency behavior, but political constraints
prevent oversight from occurring in many instances. The statement that oversight is
conditionally impactful may seem a bit vexing. On the one hand, Part III
demonstrates that oversight can be highly consequential, reducing the rate of
recurrence of infractions by 18.5%. Considering that oversight hearings are
sometimes dismissed as little more than venues for political posturing, this finding is
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noteworthy, and should be cause for optimism among those that see congressional
engagement with the administrative state as important.177 Moreover, Part II shows
that outlier committees conduct oversight less frequently, mitigating the charge that
committee-based oversight may distort agency action away from the median
legislator’s preferences.
On the other hand, Part II also suggests that principal-agent issues inherent in
the relationship between Congress and its committees push overseers to be highly
selective concerning which infractions they address. While the existence of a
bifurcated principal does clip the wings of outlier committees, tempering their
influence over administative outcomes, it also leads to fewer subjects being covered
in hearings relative to what would be address with a system in which committees
perfectly mirror floor preferences. Thus, committee oversight arguably does not fully
reflect Congress’s priorities.
What is one to make of these findings? The following sections discuss
implications of the results presented supra.
A. Committee-Chamber Relations
Congress-agency interactions are best thought of not as a clear principalagent relationship, but instead as a relationship where the cooperation of two
actors—the committee and Congress—which together can be considered the
principal, may be necessary for effective oversight. According to J.R. DeShazo &
Jody Freeman, congressional involvement in administration involves a “double
delegation,” in which Congress transfers ex ante policymaking authority to agencies,
and entrusts responsibility for ex post monitoring of this first delegation to
congressional committees and subcommittees—with principal-agent problems
ingrained in both delegations.178
Concerning this second delegation, the finding in Part II that preference
divergence between committees and their parent chamber is associated with less
frequent oversight suggests that slack exists in the principal-agent relationship
177

Because this analysis only considers the effects of completed oversight hearings, it may
underestimate oversight’s impact. Much like the threat of litigation brings potential defendants—
mindful of the frictional costs involved in a legal defense—to the settlement table, the threat of
oversight hearings—with their own attendant frictional costs—may convince agencies to comply with
committee demands. In this way, oversight’s “second face of power” influences agency behavior
without the need for any observable action by the committee. Cf. Peter Bachrach and Morton S.
Baratz, Two Faces of Power, 56 AM. POLI. SCI. REV. 947 (1962).
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DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 15, at 1444-46.
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between Congress and its committees. The functional split between committees,
which are responsible for oversight, and Congress, which alone is authorized to
punish agencies should they ignore committee overseers, limits the set of topics on
which strategic committees will engage on oversight.
This feature of Congress has implications concerning the comprehensiveness
of oversight, raising questions concerning the importance of oversight as a means of
congressional control over the administrative state.179 Consider how oversight
activity would differ if, hypothetically, there were no principal-agent problem
between Congress and its committees, i.e., if committee preferences perfectly
mirrored the floor. The status quo promotes the odd result of committees devoting
less attention to overseeing agencies with differing preferences than the committee,
because the committee recognizes that agencies with differing preferences are less
likely to comply with committee demands following a hearing and more likely to
court legislative sanctions. But if committee preferences perfectly matches those of
Congress, committees would not need to consider whether holding hearings would
awaken a slumbering Congress to move policy away from committee preferences.
Instead, agencies with policy preferences that are far from Congress’s (and its
committees’) preferences would receive greater oversight attention, and agencies
whose preferences are aligning with Congress’s (and its committees’) preferences
would receive less attention.
Slack in the principal-agent relationship between Congress and its
committees prevents this more sensible behavior from occurring. The presence of a
bifurcated congressional structure limits committees’ oversight activity, relative to
the amount of activity that would occur if committees were perfect agents of
Congress. With this bifurcated principal, a strategic committee will restrict the set of
agencies or topics that it monitors, as the committee’s preferences diverge from those
of other relevant actors. Under certain conditions, a committee with either a
sufficiently different political outlook than Congress or than an agency within its
jurisdiction may choose to ignore agency behavior that the committee opposes. Thus,
two principal-agent problems hamper Congress’s ability to control the administrative
See Beermann, supra note 11, at 142-43 (noting that oversight “may allow for too much deviation
from the terms of the legislative program and from the preferences of Congress as a whole given that
oversight does not include the discipline of public majority votes in Congress … There are reasons to
be wary of a system [allowing] … small groups within Congress to shape administrative action.”);
DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 15, at 1447 (“Double delegation creates a serious risk … that agency
decision-making … will be driven by the interest of small sub-majorities of Congress.”); Jonathan T.
Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative State: A Structural and Institutional Defense of
Judicial Power Over Statutory Interpretation, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1239, 1291 (2002) (doubting that
“oversight committees accurately reflect the views of the House or Senate as a whole”).
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state: (i) Congress’s delegation of policymaking power to agencies leads to one form
of agency cost, and (ii) the branch’s delegation of the task of monitoring the
administrative state to its committees leads to a second form.180
B. Majoritarianism
A pessimistic reading of these findings suggests that Congress cannot control
delegated powers via committee-based action, since the presence of a bifurcated
principal leads committees to ignore agencies that Congress, in the aggregate, would
prefer to actively monitor. Under this view, Congress’s “double delegation”—of
policymaking authority to agencies and of policy oversight to its committees—
suggests a failure to ensure that policy outcomes reflect Congress’s will, either via
detailed statutory enactments or through ex post monitoring that reflects the
preferences of the legislative branch.181
A more balanced interpretation, however, notes the presence of a subtle
majoritarian dynamic in the oversight dilemma. As Part II shows, committees devote
greater attention to oversight when their preferences are more closely aligned with
those of the parent chamber. That committees’ oversight decisions are made with an
eye towards the larger legislature indicates a degree of committee responsiveness to
its principal.
This responsiveness provides a rejoinder to scholars that, pointing to the
unrepresentative nature of congressional committees, contend that the President
ought to possess greater power over the administrative state.182 The argument for
greater presidential control at Congress’s expense often begins with the premise that
“congressional” control really means control by committees.183 Given the supposed
unrepresentativeness of committees and their susceptibility to interest group
capture,184 the argument continues, greater presidential control of administration is
180
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preferable to an expanded role for congressional committees.185
The results reported in Part II cast doubt on this critique. That oversight
increases as committee and chamber preferences converge suggests instead that
committee-based oversight involves some measure of accountability to Congress.
Unrepresentative committees are not given free rein to impose their views on
agencies. Rather, the prospect of committee-disfavored legislative action deters
outlier committees from attempting to influence agencies within their jurisdictions
via the oversight process. In this way, the presence of a bifurcated congressional
principal serves as a majoritarian check on unrepresentative committees.
C. Jurisdictional Redundancy
To some observers, the fact that unrepresentative committees are less likely
to use the oversight process to pull agencies towards their preferences may appear to
be faint praise for the system. After all, this finding implies that agencies situated
within the jurisdictions of unrepresentative committees may enjoy some degree of
unfettered discretion. This feature, however, also suggests a benefit of Congress’s
fragmented oversight system, in which multiple committees, in both chambers, share
jurisdiction for many agencies.186 According to DeShazo & Freeman, “Congress is
best viewed as a collection of rivals who vie for control over power delegated to
agencies.”187 But while DeShazo & Freeman consider this competition among
unrepresentative committees and subcommittees as creating “risk that submajorities
will ultimately direct agency implementation,”188 the findings presented in this
Article mollify their conclusion. The presence of multiple committees with
overlapping jurisdictions may mitigate the possibility that preference divergence
between the legislative branch and any one particular committee will leave some
agencies unmonitored.
This finding speaks to a debate regarding the impact of committees’
exclusive jurisdictional “property rights” on congressional capacity. Whereas one
group of scholars critiques committee jurisdictional redundancy as inefficient,
discouraging congressional involvement in administration and, thus, allowing the
executive to act with fewer congressional checks,189 others acknowledge benefits to
See Calabresi, supra note 182, at 51 (“Congressional committee chairs are in many ways rival
executives to the cabinet secretaries whose departments and personal offices they oversee.”).
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jurisdictional fragmentation, including the decreased susceptibility of multiple
entities to interest group capture and the increased likelihood that problems will be
discovered with redundant safeguards.190 The existence of a bifurcated principal—
which limits committee oversight activity where the relevant committee’s ideological
outlook diverges from from that the target agency or Congress—suggests an
additional benefit of duplicative committees; redundancy increases the likelihood
that for at least one committee, the preference relationships between committee,
chamber, and agency that are associated with more frequent oversight will be
properly aligned.
D. Checking the President
These findings also suggest that a reconsideration of the dominant
perspective concerning executive-congressional power dynamics is in order. Part III
provides a partial corrective to popular accounts of the current balance of powers;
Part II offers an institutional design strategy to militate against further executive
aggrandizement.
The notion that the executive branch plays an outsized role in governance,
exercising legislative and judicial functions with few perceived checks from
Congress or the courts, has gained wide currency in recent years.191 Presidential selfaggrandizement, Congress’s routine delegation of lawmaking functions to executive
agencies, and the Supreme Court’s willingness to abide these broad delegations so
long as Congress provides a bare “intelligible principle” to guide agency
Irony of Congressional Oversight, 58 AM. J. POLI. SCI. 387 (2014); Patricia Wald & Neil Kinkopf,
Putting Separation of Powers into Practice: Reflections on Senator Schumer’s Essay, 1 HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. 41, 47 (2007); Beermann, supra note 11, at 122; NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST
ATTACKS, 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 104-07 (2004).
See Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing
Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1655, 1691-99 (2006). Cf. RICHARD POSNER,
PREVENTING SURPRISE ATTACKS: INTELLIGENCE REFORM IN THE WAKE OF 9/11 36 (2005) (arguing
that, without competition, agencies may grow complacent).
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See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2606 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting “the
continuing aggrandizement of the Executive Branch”); City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863,
1879 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]the danger posed by the growing power of the
administrative state cannot be dismissed.”); supra note 14 (collecting citations to scholarly work).
During the Obama administration, these concerns emanated mostly from conservatives. See, e.g., Josh
Blackman, Presidential Maladministration, – ILL. L. REV. – (forthcoming, 2018). With the change in
administration, the roles of conservatives as critics of, and progressives as abettors in, presidential
aggrandizement likely will flip. See Adrian Vermeule, Two Futures for Administrative Law, Notice &
Comment Blog, Nov. 30, 2016, available on-line at http://yalejreg.com/nc/two-futures-foradministrative-law-by-adrian-vermeule/ (last accessed Jan. 2, 2017).
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policymaking, when taken together, all reinforce the view of an executive ascendant,
with Congress imposing few restrictions on its power.192
While misgivings regarding trends in the relative power of the political
branches are legitimate, the narrative of an enfeebled Congress unable to check an
unbounded executive (except through the rare passage of new laws) is deficient.193
As Part III of this Article shows, this account ignores Congress’s extra-legislative
powers, including committee oversight of executive agencies, as a means of
controlling administrative outcomes.
Taken in tandem with Part III, Part II demonstrates that the structure and
characteristics of the members of the committee system impact Congress’s ability to
conduct oversight, and thus to exercise control over the executive branch. Findings
that certain institutional design characteristics facilitate oversight may motivate
Congress to reorganize along those lines to more vigorously check the White
House.194
E. Administrative Democracy
Whereas some scholars worry that the President plays too large of a role in
the administrative state, others claim that holes in the President’s control over
See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 742-75 (2001) (delineating the expansive
terms of the nondelegation doctrine); Watts, supra note 114, at 1003 (noting Congress’s sweeping
delegations to agencies); Kagan, supra note 119 (describing the President’s growing role in the
administrative state).
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administration leave agencies without sufficient democratic checks. At least since
the New Deal era, judges and commentators have charged that Congress’s
delegations of policymaking authority to administrative agencies create a
democratically unaccountable “fourth branch” of government.195
Since that period, a central project of administrative law has involved
reconciling the practical reality of a technocratic administrative state with
democratic, liberal-legalistic values.196 In previous generations, this effort
emphasized designing administrative procedures to encourage public participation in
administrative decision-making.197 Later expansion of access to the courts helped
ensure that agencies adhere to these public-minded procedural requirements.198
More recently, scholars have argued that the fact that a democratically
elected President heads the executive branch provides some redress for the
administrative state’s supposed “democratic deficit.”199 For instance, Elena Kagan
(writing years prior to her investiture) claimed that “presidential control of
administration … possesses advantages over any alternative control device in
advancing … core democratic values.”200
Indeed, the administrative state’s connection to a democratically elected
President provides a rationale for the judiciary’s deferential posture in reviewing
agency activity. Most notably, in granting agencies wide latitude in interpreting
ambiguous statutes, the Chevron Court explained:
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief
Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of
the Government to make such policy choices—resolving the
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competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not
resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged
with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.201
To the extent that Chevron and its progency are rooted in these dual links
between (i) agencies and the President and (ii) the President and the public,
skepticism regarding either of these links call into question the doctrine’s continued
viability. The Court raised such doubts in Free Enterprise Fund. In that case, the
Court stated that “[t]he growth of the Executive Branch, which now wields vast
power and touches almost every aspect of daily life, heightens the concern that it
may slip from the Executive’s control, and thus from that of the people.”202 By this
view, the President provides the democratic bridge between the administrative state
and the people—and this connection is precarious.203 Justices Clarence Thomas and
Neil Gorsuch express similar concerns.204
The notion that only presidential control can redress the administrative state’s
democratic deficit is puzzling. Ex post congressional involvement in administration
is real and significant; committee-based oversight provides Congress with an
ongoing means of influencing agency behavior. Administrative lawyers and scholars
have pushed for changes in administrative procedures, judicial doctrine, and
executive branch structures as means of increasing democratic accountability in the
administrative state.205 Greater attention to redesigning congressional structures to
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facilitate oversight could play a similar function.
The prospect of Congress filling gaps in the other branches’ oversight is
particularly promising in areas in which courts are particularly reticent to act. For
instance, under Heckler v. Chaney “agency decisions to refuse enforcement” is
“general[ly] unsuitab[le] for judicial review.”206 This doctrine places a theoretically
infinite set of non-actions outside of the courts’ field of vision. Yet Congress holds
no such qualms about probing agencies’ decisions to refrain from acting.207
I do not wish to seem Pollyannaish about the ability of oversight to “solve”
the democratic deficit. An 18.5% reduction is not earth-shattering. But neither should
we ignore Congress’s function as watchdog over the administrative state, which
provides a measure—albeit limited—of democratic accountability to agency
decision-making. Congressional oversight is one tool among many that can push
agencies towards greater public accountability.
CONCLUSION
Through its oversight function, Congress plays an important—and often
overlooked—role in the administrative state after the passage of laws. Although
hearings do not directly compel agencies to act, the signal they provide to both
targeted agencies and the larger legislative branch concerning the prospect of future
legislative sanctions following continued non-compliance may persuade agencies to
conform to committee preferences. In this way, Congress’s ability to conduct
oversight can be placed among the branch’s set of persuasive, “soft powers.”208
Whereas scholarship focused on lawmaking, the ex ante design of administrative
procedures, and other formal means of control concludes that Congress has ceded
considerable control over administration to the White House,209 this Article shows
that, when certain conditions are met, ex post oversight can be remarkably impactful.
This conclusion is subject to several caveats. Part III.B acknowledges, while
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infractions in the “treatment” and “control” groups are substantially similar in
important respects, they are not identical. (Neither could they be.) Because my
research design aggregates individual infractions and hearings, each of which
undoubtedly has unique characteristics, in the service of general conclusions, it
necessarily ignores nuances present in any particular episode. Although this project
is therefore incomplete, there is value in a first-cut assessment of the impact of
oversight hearings in toto.
Further, that oversight can be effective does not imply that it is efficient.
Congress has many tools to influence agency behavior, from whistleblower statutes
and the design of administrative structures to convention-based legislative vetoes and
the newly reinvigorated Congressional Review Act. Whether oversight hearings lead
to greater welfare gains within Congress than other mechanisms is beyond the
Article’s scope.
Although examining connections between oversight activity and the relative
alignment of Congress, its committees, and executive agencies is a positive and
descriptive project, the implications of this work are prescriptive. In an era of
growing judicial concerns about democratic control over administration, oversight
holds promise as a means of involving the popular branch in administrative decisionmaking. Further, Congress can tailor its internal institutional design to enhance the
role that the branch plays in administration. If Congress desires to strength its hand
in administration, this Article provides a blueprint showing how to do so.
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